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   IN MEMORIAM
On Friday May 31, 2013  23-year-old Saskatchewan Environment 
and Resource Management Conservation Officer Justin Knackstedt 
was struck and killed by a vehicle. Officer Knackstedt and several 
other officers were diverting  traffic at the scene of an earlier 
accident when RCMP constables received reports of a car being 
driven erratically in the area. A constable spotted the vehicle 
stopped in traffic backed up  from the earlier accident and made 
contact with the driver. As the constable spoke with the driver the 
man suddenly drove into the area that was closed to traffic and 
struck Officer Knackstedt, killing  him. The driver continued to flee 
until crashing into a ditch where he was apprehended. 
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
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inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
British Columbia Police & Peace 
Officers’ Memorial Service
Sunday, September 29th, 2013
British Columbia Legislature
Victoria, BC
Canadian Police & Peace 
Officers’ 36th Annual Memorial 
Service
Sunday, September 29th, 2013
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
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4
Single Phone Call To Buy Drugs Inadmissible As 
Hearsay
6
Concern For Destruction Of Digital Evidence 
Justified No-Knock
10
Handcuffing During Safety Search Compatible With 
Investigative Detention
13
2012 Police Reported Crime 15
Odour Plus Provides Reasonable Suspicion For ASD 20
Confidential Info + Observations & Inferences 
Provide Grounds
22
Warrantless Entry: Objective Basis Must Support 
Subjective Belief
24
Random Stop Purpose Must  Relate To Road Safety 
Interest
27
911 Call Justifies Police Entry 28
Prospective Production Of Future Text Messages Is 
An Intercept
33
No Detention During Undercover Traffic Stop 35
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter. If you would like to be added to our 
electronic distribution subscribe at: www.10-8.ca  
Upcoming Conferences
???	 ????????	 
?	 ????????????????????	 ??????????	 ???	 
?????????	 ?????????	 ????????	 ????
September 10-11, 2013
JIBC
New Westminster, British Columbia 
????????	 ??????????????	 ???????	 ??????	 
???????????	 ??????????
September 23-26, 2013
Vancouver, British Columbia
34th ????????	 ????????	 ??	 ????????	 ???????
October 2-5, 2013
Vancouver, British Columbia
????	 ??????	 ????????????????	 
????????	 ??????????
October 7-9, 2013
Dayton, Ohio
???	 ???????????	 ??	 ??	 ??????	 ????????
??????????	 ???????????	 ???????????	 ??????????
November 6, 2013
JIBC
New Westminster, British Columbia 
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
see 
pages   
39-40
see 
page   
38
Volume 13 Issue 4 - July/August 2013
PAGE 3
??????	 ???	 ???	 ??????	 ??	 
???	 ???????
The JIBC Library is an excellent resource for 
learning. Here is a list of its most recent acquisitions 
which may be of interest to police. 
Advanced presentations by design: creating 
communication that drives action.
Andrew V. Abela, Ph.D.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, A Wiley Imprint, 2013.
HF 5718.22 A24 2013
Canadian  political structure and public 
administration.
Geoffrey J. Booth, Laura E. Booth, Andrew J. Rowley.
Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications, 
2013.
JL 75 B66 2013
Culture savvy:  working  and collaborating  across 
the globe.
Maureen Briget Rabotin.
Alexandria, VA: American Society for Training  & 
Development, 2011.
HF 5549.5 M5 R325 2011
Fear your strengths: what you are best at could 
be your biggest problem.
Robert E. Kaplan, Robert B. Kaiser.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2013.
HD 57.7 K365 2013
Group dynamics for teams.
Daniel Levi.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2013.
HD 66 L468 2013
Leading  out loud: a guide for engaging  others in 
creating the future.
Terry Pearce; foreword by Randy Komisar.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2013.
HD 57.7 P4 2013
Making  elearning  stick:  techniques for easy and 
effective transfer of technology-supported 
training.
Barbara Carnes.
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Pr., 2012.
LB 1028.5 C376 2012
Proposals that work: a guide for planning 
dissertations and grant proposals.
Lawrence F. Locke, Waneen Wyrick Spirduso, 
Stephen J. Silverman.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2013.
Q 180.55 P7 L63 2013
The rules of work: a definitive code for personal 
success.
Richard Templar
Harlow, UK: Pearson Business, 2013.
HF 5386 T34 2013
Scenario-based e-learning:  evidence-based 
guidelines for online workforce learning.
Ruth Colvin Clark.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, a Wiley imprint, 2013.
HF 5549.5 T7 C588 2013
Smart trust: creating  prosperity, energy and joy in 
a low-trust world.
Stephen M.R. Covey and Greg  Link; with Rebecca R. 
Merrill.
New York, NY: Free Press, c2012.
HF 5387 C677 2012
So good they can't ignore you: why skills trump 
passion in the quest for work you love.
Cal Newport.
New York, NY: Business Plus, 2012.
HF 5381 N497 2012
There is an I in  team:  what elite athletes and 
coaches really know about high performance.
Mark de Rond.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012.
HD 66 R648 2012
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R. v. Ashby, 2013 BCCA 334
A police officer clocked a vehicle 
travelling  94 km/h in an 80 km/h 
zone. It was also being  driven 
outside the tracks that had been 
made in the snow by other vehicles. 
The driver’s window was down about one-quarter 
the way and the sun roof was open part-way, even 
though it was -21 Celsius. The officer was concerned 
about the accused’s level of sobriety  and pulled the 
Hyundai over. The vehicle was a rental and the 
officer noted a  strong  odour of vegetative green 
marihuana, similar to the smell of marihuana in a 
grow operation. He noted a red bag  on the 
passenger’s seat, fast food wrappers on the floor and 
an odour of men’s cologne. The officer asked the 
accused for her driver’s licence and the rental 
agreement. A computer search revealed she had a 
conviction for possessing  a narcotic about 22 years 
earlier. When the officer returned to the vehicle to 
issue a warning  ticket, he arrested the accused for 
possessing  marihuana, advised her of the right to 
counsel and patted her down. She was not permitted 
to speak to counsel at the roadside, instead access 
was provided at the police station. As a result of 
searching  her vehicle, about 21 kgs. of marihuana 
was found in the trunk and $17,000 in the travel bag 
on the front passenger seat. The accused was 
subsequently charged with possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The officer testified he was familiar with 
three distinct marihuana related odours:
 
• burnt (ie. smoked), 
• bud (ie. harvested) and 
• plants (ie. vegetative/growing). 
He said the odour, along  with other possible 
indicators of drug-related activity, provided him with 
the necessary grounds to believe that the accused 
was then in possession of marihuana. These possible 
indicators of drug related activity included:
• a rented vehicle - often used by drug  couriers to 
avoid detection and seizure of their own 
vehicles. Also used to deny knowledge of any 
drugs that may be found;
• the smell of men’s cologne - often used by drug 
couriers to mask the smell of marihuana;
• the fast-food wrappers - as drug couriers do not 
wish to stop for very long  or leave their vehicles 
unattended they will pick up food from drive-
through or fast-food restaurants; and
• the partially open driver’s window and sun-roof 
in minus 21 degree weather - the accused may 
have been trying  to vent the smell of marihuana 
from the vehicle.
The trial judge concluded that the arrest was lawful 
under s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code. First, he found 
that the “the strong  odour of vegetative  marihuana ... 
was sufficient on its own to support a reasonable 
belief that [the accused] was in possession of 
marihuana, or had committed the indictable offence 
of being  in possession of marihuana.” Plus, there 
were other indicators that added significance to the 
odour and informed the officer’s decision to arrest. 
In the judge’s view, the arrest was justified under 
both s. 495(1)(a)  (reasonable  grounds to believe an 
indictable offence had been committed)  or s. 495(1)
(b)  (finds committing a  criminal offence)  and the 
search of the vehicle incident to that arrest. As for s. 
10(b) of the Charter, the judge concluded the 
accused’s right to counsel was not infringed. Finally, 
even if the accused’s rights had been breached, the 
judge would have admitted the  evidence  under s. 24
(2). She was convicted of possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that Her arrest 
was unlawful. In her view, the 
officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to bel ieve that an 
indictable offence had been committed or was about 
to be committed (s. 495(1)(a))  nor make sufficient 
observations to support a reasonable inference that 
she was committing  the crime of possessing 
marihuana (s. 495(1)(b)). As well, she contended her 
right to counsel had been infringed because, in part, 
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she was not permitted to contact a lawyer by 
cellphone at the roadside.
The Arrest
Although the trial judge upheld the legality of the 
accused’s arrest under both ss. 495(1)(a)  or (b), 
Justice Frankel, delivering  the unanimous Court of 
Appeal judgment, found the arrest only justifiable 
under s. 495(1)(b). Possession of more than 30 grams 
of marihuana, a dual or hybrid offence, is deemed 
an indictable offence at the investigative stage but 
possession of 30 grams or less is only a summary 
offence. In this case, the officer subjectively believed 
the accused was in possession of marihuana but he 
had no idea how much marihuana was involved and 
did not testify he believed more than 30 grams were 
present. “Absent a subjective belief that the amount 
of marihuana present was more than 30 grams, [the 
officer’s] powers of arrest were limited to those 
applicable to summary  conviction offences,“ said 
Justice Frankel. “He only went as far as saying  that 
he believed some unknown amount of marihuana 
was present.” Thus, the accused’s arrest could not be 
supported under s. 495(1)(a).
Under s.  495(1)(b) - finds committing  a criminal 
offence  - the officer was required to have reasonable 
grounds to believe the accused was apparently 
committing  the offence of possessing  marihuana in 
his presence. “An arrest will be lawful if the arresting 
officer subjectively believes he or she has the 
requisite reasonable grounds and those grounds are 
objectively reasonable,” said justice Frankel. In this 
case, since there were additional factors considered 
by the arresting  officer, it was unnecessary for the 
Court of Appeal to determine whether the odour of 
marihuana by itself was sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief. The Court concluded that “the 
factual matrix that existed at the time the arrest 
decision was made satisfies the objective criterion.” 
Although some of the factors considered by the 
officer “standing  alone can be consistent with non-
criminal activity, their combined effect, when 
viewed through the lens of a  police  officer’s 
experience, cannot be ignored.” Here, the Court 
found that a  reasonable person standing  in the 
officer’s shoes would believe that the accused was 
apparently  committing  the  offence of possessing 
marihuana:
In addition to detecting the strong  odour of 
vegetative marihuana emanating from the 
Hyundai, [the officer] observed a number of 
things which, based on his experience, were 
consistent with [the accused] being a drug 
courier.  It was the cumulative effect of what his 
senses pe rce ived—the to ta l i t y o f the 
circumstances—that gave rise to his belief that 
she was in possession of marihuana. When all of 
[the officer’s] olfactory and visual observations 
are assessed on a practical, non-technical, and 
common sense basis, his decision to arrest is 
objectively justified. [reference omitted, para. 
59]
WHAT WAS FOUND
Police located the following items in the Hyundai:
• three garbage bags in the trunk:  slightly 
more than 21 kilograms of marihuana inside 41 
vacuum-sealed Ziploc bags; inside each vacuum-
sealed bag were two plastic bags each containing 
approximately 500 grams of marihuana;
• blue duffel bag in the trunk: clothing and a 
sealed Ziploc bag containing two plastic bags, each 
containing 510 grams of marihuana;
• red bag on the passenger seat:  female 
clothing and toiletries, several bundles of cash (i.e., 
$100, $50, and $20 bills) bound with elastic bands 
totalling $17,000;
• front area of the vehicle: empty and full energy 
drink cans and fast-food wrappers;
• toque on the passenger seat contained a 
bottle of cologne, a $10 bill, two full energy “shots” 
and a cellular telephone.
“An arrest will be lawful if the arresting officer subjectively believes he or she has the 
requisite reasonable grounds and those grounds are objectively reasonable.”
“”
“Notwithstanding that each of those factors 
standing alone can be consistent with non-
criminal activity, their combined effect, when 
viewed through the lens of a police officer’s 
experience, cannot be ignored.”
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Right to Counsel
As part of her s. 10(b) Charter argument, the accused 
suggested that she should have been allowed to 
contact counsel at the roadside by cellphone. But 
the Court of Appeal rejected this submission. Here, 
the officer explained that he would not allow her to 
use a cellular telephone for reasons of officer safety:
Officer: When people are hauling contraband, 
often there’s another vehicle, a protection 
vehicle, so – or they could call a friend or call 
someone else. When I’m by myself dealing with 
this vehicle, I am focused on that vehicle, so I’m 
not focused on any other vehicle.  So if I give 
access and she calls her blocker vehicle and the 
blocker vehicle comes around me, that’s an 
officer safety issue.
Although s. 10(b)  provides that an arrested or 
detained person has the right “to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay” - which has been interpreted 
as “immediately” - concerns for officer and public 
safety could excuse immediate compliance with the 
implementational component. Justice Frankel stated:
In the case at bar, it was neither reasonable nor 
practical for [the officer] to implement access to 
counsel at the roadside. He had just arrested [the 
accused] for a drug-related offence and had 
reason to believe there were drugs in her 
vehicle.  Until back-up arrived, he was solely 
responsible for maintaining  control of both her 
and the vehicle.  Once back-up ... arrived, [the 
officer] did a cursory search of the Hyundai and, 
upon finding marihuana, immediately drove [the 
accused] to the detachment, five minutes away.  
The delay here was plainly minimal. [para. 73]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Baldree, 2013 SCC 35
While investigating  a suspected 
break-in at an apartment, police 
arrested the accused for drug 
offences and seized from him a cell 
phone and cash. When the phone 
rang  at the  police station, an officer answered it and 
the caller asked for the accused. The officer said he 
was running  the show now and the caller provided 
an address and requested an ounce of weed for 
$150.  The police, however, made no effort at all to 
contact the caller at the address provided and no 
delivery  was made. The accused was charged with 
possession for the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Despite the accused’s objection that the 
evidence of the telephone call was 
inadmissible hearsay, the judge found the 
evidence to be “non-hearsay.” He 
concluded that the phone call was not tendered for 
the truth of the fact that the accused was a drug 
trafficker but that it was circumstantial evidence of 
an individual engaged in drug  trafficking. Since  the 
evidence was not hearsay, it was unnecessary to 
weigh its probative value against its prejudicial 
effect. The call was admitted as substantive evidence 
that the accused was engaged in drug  trafficking  and 
he was convicted of possessing  marijuana and 
cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appea led , 
arguing  the drug  purchase 
phone call was presumptively 
inadmissible as hearsay, did 
not fall within any of the 
listed or principled exceptions and, even if it was 
non-hearsay, its prejudicial effect outweighed its 
probative value. Two of three judges, writing 
separate opinions, set aside the accused’s conviction 
and ordered a  new trial. Justice Feldman concluded 
Canadian Police & Peace Officers’ 
36th Annual Memorial Service
Sunday, September 29th, 2013
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
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that the phone call was not admitted as 
circumstantial evidence but rather as hearsay that 
the accused was a drug  dealer, which was untested 
by cross-examination. The telephone call was not 
admissible  because it could not withstand scrutiny 
under the principled approach to the hearsay 
rule. Plus, its probative value was outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. Justice Blair, who also ordered a 
new trial, was uncertain whether the evidence 
constituted hearsay. However, he found it failed on 
both an assessment of its necessity and reliability 
and on weighing  its probative value against its 
prejudicial effect. Justice Watt, in dissent, opined 
that the evidence of a single drug  purchase call was 
properly admissible as non-hearsay. In his view, 
even if the drug  purchase call was improperly 
admitted at trial, the conviction should nevertheless 
be upheld.  
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown appealed, 
arguing  that the drug 
purchase phone call was 
not hearsay and was 
admissible  as evidence. All 
nine judges, however, agreed that the call was 
hearsay and inadmissible as it failed to satisfy any of 
the traditional exceptions to hearsay nor meet the 
principled approach, but two separate  opinions were 
delivered.
What is hearsay?
Justice Fish, writing  the eight member majority 
decision, noted the following points about hearsay:
• An out-of-court statement by a person not 
called as a witness in the proceedings is 
properly characterized as hearsay where it is 
tendered in evidence to make proof of the truth 
of its contents.
• Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible 
unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay 
rule.
• There are traditional exceptions to the hearsay 
rule as well as a principled approach supported 
by indicia of necessity and reliability.
• The exclusionary rule  for hearsay  applies to 
“express hearsay” and “implied hearsay”. 
He stated:
The defining  features of hearsay are (1) the fact 
that the statement is adduced to prove the truth 
of its contents and (2) the absence of a 
contemporaneous opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant. …
In short, hearsay evidence is presumptively 
inadmissible because of the difficulties inherent 
in testing the reliability of the declarant’s 
assertion. Apart from the inability of the trier of 
fact to assess the declarant’s demeanour in 
making  the assertion, courts and commentators 
have identified four specific concerns.  They 
relate to the declarant’s perception, memory, 
narration, and sincerity. [references omitted, 
paras. 30-31]
Why is cross examination so important? 
Cross examination provides the opportunity  to probe 
the declarant for potential errors, allowing  the 
assertion imputed to the declarant to be evaluated 
with the  benefit of observing  their demeanour. 
Cross-examination can test the declarant with regard 
to:
• PERCEPTION - the declarant may have 
misperceived the facts to which the hearsay 
statement relates;
• MEMORY  - even if correctly perceived, the 
relevant facts may have been wrongly 
remembered;
• NARRATION -  the declarant may have narrated 
the relevant facts in an unintentionally 
misleading manner; and
• SINCERITY - the declarant may have knowingly 
made a false assertion.
In this case, the majority concluded that the Crown 
was not offering  the officer’s testimony of the  phone 
call as circumstantial evidence that the accused was 
a drug  trafficker but rather as hearsay (proof of the 
truth of its contents). Although the assertion was not 
explicit that the accused was a  drug  dealer (the 
accused sells drugs), it was implicit (the caller 
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wanted to purchase drugs). There  was no distinction 
in substance and the presumption of inadmissibility 
applied equally:
There is no principled or meaningful distinction 
between (a) “I am calling [the accused] because 
I want to purchase drugs from him” and (b) “I 
am calling  [the accused] because he sells 
drugs”. In either form, this out-of-court statement 
is being offered for an identical purpose: to 
prove the truth of the declarant’s assertion that 
[the accused] sells drugs. No trier of fact would 
need to be a grammarian in order to understand 
the import of this evidence. [para. 43]
So, was the evidence admissible under a listed or 
principled exception to the hearsay rule? The 
Court found it was not. First, there was no traditional 
exception that permitted its admissibility. Second, it 
failed on the principled approach of necessity and 
reliability. Neither requirement was satisfied:
NECESSITY 
‣ The police made no effort to secure the 
evidence of the caller.
‣ They never sought to interview or even find 
the caller, though he gave them his address.
‣ There was no explanation offered as to why 
no efforts were made to locate the caller.
RELIABILITY 
‣ There was no basis to say that the caller’s 
belief was reliable without testing  the basis 
for that belief by cross-examination.
Although this single  phone call was not admitted, 
Justice Fish made it clear that he  was not proposing 
a categorical rule for all drug purchase calls:
For example, where the police intercept not one 
but several drug  purchase calls, the quantity of 
the ca l l s might wel l su f f ice in some 
circumstances to establish reliability — indeed, 
while “[o]ne or two might [be] mistaken, or 
might even have conspired to frame the 
defendant as a dealer”, it would “def[y] belief 
that all the callers had made the same error or 
were all party to the same conspiracy.”
Moreover, the number of callers could also 
inform necessity.  The Crown cannot be 
expected, where there are numerous declarants, 
to locate and convince most or all to testify at 
trial, even in the unlikely event that they have 
supplied their addresses — as in this case.   And 
it is important to remember that the criteria of 
necessity and reliability work in tandem:   if the 
reliability of the evidence is sufficiently 
established, the necessity requirement can be 
relaxed. [references omitted, paras. 71-72]
Since the verdict may have been different had the 
telephone call not been admitted, the Crown’s 
appeal was dismissed. The judgment setting  aside 
the accused’s conviction and ordering  a new trial 
was affirmed.
A Second View
Justice Muldaver agreed with the majority 
tha t the drug  purchase ca l l was 
inadmissible, acknowledging  that the 
Supreme Court was now characterizing 
evidence as hearsay that had “long  been received by 
courts as circumstantial evidence.” However, he was 
concerned about the majority’s approach to 
necessity. Instead, he found the real concern and 
focus on admissibility should be reliability. He 
questioned the majority’s view that the police, in the 
name of necessity, should be required to track down 
unknown and often unknowable declarants (callers)
who are unlikely to be found and unlikely to be 
forthcoming and cooperative even if they are found:
Although it is true the police in this case had the 
benefit of the caller’s address, the caller’s identity 
was still unknown.  Surely, the police were not 
going to show up at 327 Guy St. and ask who 
there was looking  to buy drugs from [the 
accused]. Apart from officer safety concerns, the 
likelihood of the police finding  the declarant 
would seem slim.  And the prospect of the 
declarant being  forthcoming and cooperative, if 
found, would seem even sl immer.  An 
undercover drug  buy would be even more 
problematic, given the number of officers who 
would be needed to see it through and the 
obvious risks to the officer safety inherent in 
such an operation.
Under either option, the game would hardly be 
worth the candle. And that, in my view, provides 
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a full answer to the concern that the police 
offered no explanation as to why they made no 
efforts to locate the declarant.   With respect, no 
explanation was necessary — common sense 
provides one.   If there is little chance of finding 
the declarant, and little chance that, if found, he 
or she will be forthcoming  and provide the 
police with evidence in a better form than the 
call itself (such as a K.G.B. statement or 
testimony in court), the necessity criterion will 
have been met.
Equally problematic is the suggestion by my 
colleague that even where there are multiple 
callers, the police could be expected to go out 
and seek to persuade at least some of them to 
testify … . With respect, absent evidence of 
collusion, I see that as being  wasteful. It amounts 
to little more than tipping  our hat to necessity for 
necessity’s sake.   That has not been, and should 
not be, what the test for necessity requires. 
[paras. 106-108]
He also noted that multiple calls, rather than a  single 
one, may be more reliable as “common sense tells 
us that the probability of numerous callers all being 
mistaken is unlikely.” But he cautioned against the 
notion that only multiple calls could be reliable and 
would not foreclose the possibility that even a single 
drug  purchase call may, in different circumstances,  
meet the  required threshold for admissibility under 
the principled approach to hearsay.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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R. v. Lacelle, 2013 ONCA 390
 
Police sent an application at 10:20 
pm to obtain a telewarrant to search 
a home. In the ITO the affiant stated 
“There is no Justice of the Peace 
available at this time” but he did not 
take any steps to determine whether this was true. 
Nor did he know that it was factually true at the time 
he signed it. In other words, the officer swore to a 
statement that he did not know to be true, but which 
was nonetheless true. The warrant was approved by 
the Justice of the  Peace (JP), executed and drugs and 
money were seized.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
The officer admitted that he did not take 
any steps to ascertain the truth of whether 
no JP  was available, nor did he know it to 
be true at the time the warrant was 
sought. The statement, however, factually turned out 
to be true. The officer’s supervisor, who reviewed the 
draft ITO, testified that after 5:00 pm the courthouse 
in the area was closed. In his view, there was no use 
in checking  with the courthouse for a  JP as opposed 
to getting  a telewarrant. The judge concluded that 
the impracticability standard had been met, there 
was no s. 8  Charter breach and the request for the 
telewarrant was reasonable. The accused was 
convicted.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued that the 
telewarrant was inappropriately 
issued because the statement, 
“There is no Justice of the Peace 
available at this time,” was insufficiently particular to 
justify  the warrant’s signing. In his view, something 
more was required. But the  Court of Appeal 
disagreed. An issuing  justice and the reviewing 
justice may take “judicial notice of concrete local 
circumstances in assessing  the adequacy of the 
officer’s statement.”  Here, the Court found the 
affiant’s approach to obtaining  the warrant was 
somewhat casual and his lack of knowledge and 
training  troubling  – this was his first ITO, he did not 
know the statutory requirements for an ITO or a 
telewarrant and he used a  precedent. But “the 
context provided circumstantial guarantees that the 
statement that a JP  was not available was true  in 
fact.” “There was nothing  in the context to suggest to 
the officer that the statement might not be true; for 
example, it is circumstantially unlikely that [the 
affiant] would have been pursuing  a telewarrant in 
the middle of the  day when J.P.s are available  in 
Cornwall, or that his supervising  officer would have 
failed to question that statement,” said the  Court of 
Appeal. “It was, however, during  the evening.  The 
receiving  J.P. in Newmarket would also have been 
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aware of the unavailability of J.P.s in Cornwall given 
the time of the night.”
 
As an alternative argument, the accused urged 
excision of the offending  statement because the 
affiant had no personal knowledge of its truth when 
he swore the information, which made the statement 
false. In his view, if the  statement were excised, 
there  would not be reasonable grounds to issue the 
telewarrant. The seizure was therefore unlawful, the 
evidence inadmissible under s. 24(2)  of the Charter 
and an acquittal should follow. But, even assuming 
the evidence was obtained illegally, the Court of 
Appeal would have found the evidence nonetheless 
admissible.
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
???????	 ???	 ???????????	 
??	 ???????	 ????????	 ?????????	 
????????
R. v. Burke, 2013 ONCA 424
 
As part of Project Salvo, a  national 
investigation into child pornography 
being  shared over the “Gnutella” 
peer-to-peer network, police obtained 
a search warrant for the accused’s 
apartment. The accused’s IP address had been 
identified as a  user from whom child pornography 
could be downloaded. The investigator viewed two 
child pornography video files, confirmed they were 
being  offered for download by the accused’s IP 
address, and obtained his municipal address from 
the internet service provider. The ITO also stated that 
the lead investigator was aware that data files were 
highly disposable as they could be quickly hidden, 
disguised on a hard drive, password protected or 
encrypted. When police executed the warrant, 
officers kicked in the accused’s unlocked door, 
entered with guns drawn and yelled at him to get 
down on the floor. At least eight officers were 
involved, some wearing  masks. The accused, a 
computer programmer for a high-tech firm, was at 
home alone  watching  TV. He was arrested, 
handcuffed, escorted outside and a search of his 
computer revealed child pornography. A copy of the 
search warrant was left in his apartment.  He was 
charged with possessing child pornography.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused said he was terrified and 
believed, if he made a wrong  move, that 
he could be killed.  He was handcuffed, 
told he was under arrest, escorted outside 
and advised police were executing  a search warrant. 
The lead investigator testified, on the basis of her 
specialized training  and experience, that digital files 
could be easily destroyed or encrypted.  For this 
reason, as a matter of policy, she would notify the 
Tactical Unit whenever a  search warrant for child 
pornography files was to be executed. She said she 
would brief tactical officers so they could determine 
how entry would be made based on available 
information. In this case, police decided to use a 
“dynamic” or mechanical entry (no-knock), rather 
than knocking  on the door and announcing  police, 
because  of the ease with which the evidence could 
be disposed.
 
The judge accepted the reason for the no-knock 
entry.  She found the element of surprise by the 
police  was essential, given the nature of the 
materials sought, and concluded that “[t]he risk that 
the computer that contained the  pornographic 
images might be permanently compromised 
warranted a no-knock entry.”   The search was not 
unreasonable, no s. 8  Charter breach occurred and 
the accused was convicted of possessing  child 
pornography.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The accused submitted, among 
other grounds, that the manner in 
which the search was carried out 
was not reasonable. Generally, 
when the police execute a search warrant on a 
person’s home they must knock, announce their 
authority and announce the reason for entry. They 
may, however, depart from the “knock and 
announce” principle only in exigent circumstances, 
including  if there is a need to prevent the destruction 
of evidence, to ensure the safety  of the police  or the 
occupants or if in hot pursuit. In assessing  the 
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reasonableness of how a search was conducted, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal noted the following 
principles as outlined in R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31:
 
• When the police depart from the knock and 
announce principle, the  onus rests with the 
Crown (police) to justify why they did so.
• The search as a whole must be assessed in light 
of all the circumstances.
• The Crown must prove that the police had 
reasonable grounds to be concerned about 
issues of officer or occupant safety or the 
destruction of evidence.
• The Crown must demonstrate evidence that 
existed at the time of the entry; it is prohibited 
from relying on ex post facto justifications.
• Courts must consider three things when 
assessing  whether a search was conducted in a 
reasonable manner
1. the police decision to enter must be judged 
by “what was or should reasonably have 
been known to them at the time, not in 
light of how things turned out to be”;
2. there  is some scope available  to the police 
in deciding  the manner in which they enter 
the  premises. The  police “cannot be 
expected to measure in advance with 
nuanced precision the amount of force the 
situation will require.” The role of the 
reviewing  court is to balance the rights of 
suspects with the need for safe  and effective 
law enforcement; it is not to be a “Monday 
morning quarterback”,
3. an appeal court must accord substantial 
deference to the trial judge’s assessment of 
the evidence and findings of fact. - “[T]he 
question for the reviewing  judge is not 
whether every detail of the search, viewed in 
isolation was appropriate. The question for 
the judge … is whether the search overall, in 
light of the facts reasonably known to the 
police, was reasonable.” Further, the courts 
should not attempt to micromanage the 
police’s choice of equipment. 
Here, the accused submitted that the Crown failed 
to adduce any evidence capable of supporting  the 
use of a no-knock. He suggested that the police 
needed information specific to the residence or its 
inhabitants to justify such an entry.  Rather than 
requesting  the assistance of the tactical unit based 
on an individualized assessment, he argued that the 
police were relying  on a blanket policy. In his view, 
there  was no urgency, the police had been in 
possession of the information on which they acted 
for some time and there was no articulated concern 
in the ITO about violence or the presence of 
weapons. As well, the police had earlier used a ruse 
to attend at the accused’s premises and they knew 
he appeared to live alone in a one bedroom 
apartment on a ground floor and had no prior 
criminal record. He also highlighted the notion that 
a person’s home and computer are two most 
intimate places. 
 
Justice Weiler, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, found the lead investigator’s evidence that 
digital files may be quickly rendered inaccessible 
and easily destroyed warranted, as held by the trial 
judge, the element of surprise accompanying  a no-
knock entry:
 
… I do not agree that these individual tactics of 
t h e p o l i c e m a d e t h e ove ra l l s e a rch 
unreasonable. The pol ice concern for 
destruction of evidence would not have ended 
with the no-knock entry. The police did not 
know whether the [accused] would be using his 
computer at the time of entry, or if he would be 
near his computer. They also did not know if he 
would necessarily be alone in the apartment.
 
The police had a much better chance of 
preventing destruction of the digital files by 
having  enough officers present that they could 
simultaneously take control of the different 
rooms in the apartment and the suspect, as well 
as any possible visitors. It was also reasonable to 
have additional officers stationed outside the 
back and front of the apartment to ensure that 
no one entered or attempted to leave the 
apartment while the search warrant was being 
executed.  The warrant did not restrict the 
number of persons permitted to access the 
location of the search. [paras. 53-54] 
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Nor did the tactics used in executing  the warrant – a 
swarm of heavily-armed police, some wearing  masks 
with their guns drawn – render the search 
unreasonable:
 
In addition, I am not prepared to say that the use 
of drawn weapons and masks rendered the 
overall search unreasonable. The [accused] 
acknowledged that it was apparent that the 
persons in his apartment were the police. While 
he was understandably extremely frightened by 
the officers, there is no evidence that the police 
used any gratuitous or spiteful violence towards 
him. He was arrested and safely removed from 
his residence within minutes of police entry. He 
knew why the search was being carried out and 
knew that the police were authorized to carry 
out the search. The police left behind a copy of 
the warrant in the [accused’s] apartment. [paras. 
55]
 
And further:
 
It may be that it is standard practice for the 
tactical unit of the police force to conduct a 
forced entry with guns drawn and with some 
officers wearing masks.  In the absence of a 
concern for police safety, the element of 
intimidation accompanying the use of masks and 
drawn weapons may be unnecessary and is a 
cause for judicial concern. However, I am 
sensitive to Cromwell J.’s caution in Cornell, 
that, “[h]aving determined that a hard entry was 
justified, I do not think that the court should 
attempt to micromanage the police’s choice of 
equipment” ... . And as Cromwell J. made it 
clear, the role of the reviewing  court is limited to 
assessing  whether the search overall was 
reasonable. [para. 58]
 
Furthermore, the police did not cause any deliberate 
or unnecessary damage to the accused’s property, 
other than minor damage to the front door, and they 
did not seize any materials beyond those identified 
in the ITO. The fact that the accused did not have a 
prior criminal record did not alleviate  police 
concerns that he could readily destroy evidence. As 
was noted in Cornell, “A person without a criminal 
record could destroy evidence as easily as a  person 
with a criminal record.” Plus, “the [accused’s] lack 
of a prior criminal record would not provide 
assurance to police that he would react peacefully 
when confronted by police officers performing  a no-
knock entry.”  
 
The trial judge’s finding  on the validity of police 
entry  was reasonable. The unannounced entry was 
justified because of the risk that evidence (digital 
files)  could be destroyed. The no-knock entry did not 
violate the accused’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter. 
The police had legitimate concerns regarding  the 
destruction of evidence and the elements of surprise 
and speed, which did not cease with entry, enabled 
the team to sweep all the rooms almost 
simultaneously and to quickly restrain the suspect. 
There was no violence or unnecessary destruction of 
property. The search was carried out in a reasonable 
manner. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Analysis
 
The onus is on an accused to prove on a 
balance of probabilities that a search was 
unreasonable. The absence of a warrant 
presumptively establishes unreasonableness. In 
the case of a warrantless search, the Crown 
then bears the burden of proving the search 
reasonable. For a search to be reasonable 
within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, the 
search must be:
• authorized by law, 
• the law itself must be reasonable, 
and 
• the search must be carried out in a 
reasonable manner.
“The police had a much better chance of preventing destruction of the digital files by 
having enough officers present that they could simultaneously take control of the different 
rooms in the apartment and the suspect, as well as any possible visitors.”
Volume 13 Issue 4 - July/August 2013
PAGE 13
???????????	 ??????	 ??????	 
??????	 ??????????	 ????	 
?????????????	 ?????????	 
R. v. Curry, 2013 ONCA 420
Six Toronto Anti-Violence Initiative 
Strategy (TAVIS) officers decided to 
do a  walk through around an 
apartment located in an area  with a 
high crime rate. The area was known 
for criminal gangs and violence, and a shooting  had 
occurred at the building  nine days earlier. The 
suspect in the shooting  was described as a black 
male with a slim build carrying  a silver revolver. He 
was wearing  a black hoody and a grey hat with ear 
flaps. One witness also described the suspect as 
wearing  his hair in dreadlocks. The TAVIS officers 
were in uniform and arrived at about 10:46 pm. The 
accused, in company two other males, exited from 
the front doors of the building  at about 10:48 pm. 
All three were young  black males with their heads 
covered. Byfield had a black hood covering  his head 
and was carrying  a  red pouch or purse. Turner was 
wearing  a black toque and carrying  a white plastic 
shopping  bag. The accused was wearing  a grey  hat 
with ear flaps.
As the men walked to the  curb of the driveway 
where  a taxi was parked, three police officers 
followed. As Byfield opened the rear passenger door 
and was about to get into the taxi an officer saw a 
bulge at his waist. After a  brief conversation the 
officer heard another officer shout, “Check his 
waistband.” Byfield’s outer shirt was lifted and the 
butt of a silver handgun was seen tucked into his 
waistband. The officer yelled “gun”.  As this 
occurred, another officer immediately grabbed 
Turner, pulled him to the ground and drew his 
firearm. Turner was handcuffed, searched and police 
found a  loaded handgun in his jacket pocket and 17 
rounds of ammunition in a pant pocket. The accused 
was also grabbed, taken to the  ground and 
handcuffed. A gun was found down the front of his 
pants. All three men were subsequently  arrested and 
charged with a number of criminal offences, 
including possession of a loaded restricted firearm.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The three accused argued they were 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the 
Charter and subject to unreasonable 
searches under s. 8. The judge found that 
Byfield had not been detained until the officer took 
physical control of him and lifted up his over-shirt. 
The detention, however, was based on a reasonable 
suspicion that justified a pat search for weapons. The 
lifting  up  of Byfield’s over-shirt, while  not technically 
a “pat search”, was the functional equivalent of one. 
No s. 8  Charter breach occurred. As for Curry and 
Turner, they were not detained until the  officers 
heard “gun” and reacted by taking  them to the 
ground, handcuffing  them and searching  them for 
weapons . The “p re l iminary inves t i ga t ive 
questioning” that occurred before this did not 
constitute  detention. “I am satisfied, in all these 
circumstances, that Curry was only asked the same 
kinds of ‘exploratory’ questions as Turner and Byfield 
were asked and that he was ‘delayed’ from entering 
the taxi for less than a minute, … without engaging 
s. 9 and s. 10 Charter rights,” said the judge. The 
judge went on to hold that the officers believed 
there  was a reasonable suspicion (or reasonable 
“possibility”)  that Curry and Turner were  armed with 
a gun based on “objective grounds” and on a 
“demonstrable rationale.” The officer “had 
incomplete  information and she was suddenly in a 
dangerous situation requiring  an immediate 
decision,” said the judge. “She had sufficient 
grounds, in my opinion, to briefly detain Curry and 
conduct a pat search for weapons.” Neither Turner 
nor Curry had their ss. 8 or 9 Charter rights 
infringed.
The judge also rejected Turner and Curry’s argument 
that forcefully throwing  them to the ground, 
followed by handcuffing, was not a common law 
detention but rather an arrest. The judge ruled that, 
in this case, taking  Curry and Turner to the ground 
did not indicate a “de facto arrest” but rather an 
exercise of the common law duty “to protect life”. 
“A quick pat search for weapons, as in the present 
case, is entirely compatible  with a common law 
detention,” said the  judge. “Furthermore, briefly 
handcuffing  a suspect to safely enable a pat search 
for weapons and/or to prevent flight has been held 
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to be compatible with a common law detention. … 
[T]he police were, in reality, exercising  common law 
powers of investigative detention and not statutory 
powers of arrest.” Since there were no Charter 
violations there was no need to consider s. 24(2). 
However, had there been Charter breaches, the 
evidence would have been admissible. All three men 
were convicted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused Curry appealed his 
conviction arguing  the police 
arrested him when they took him 
to the ground and handcuffed him, 
thereby breaching  s. 9 of the Charter and unlawfully 
searched him in breach of s. 8. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed, upholding  the trial judge’s ruling 
that the accused was not prevented by police from 
entering  the taxi and therefore was not detained at 
that point. Also, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
trial judge that when the police took the accused to 
the ground, they were acting  in the exercise of their 
common law duty to protect life:
 
The take down of the [accused] occurred after a 
police officer observed a gun in the possession 
of one of the [accused’s] co-accused and 
shouted a warning to the other police officers.  
The officers attending to the [accused] did not 
know who had the gun. Their decision to take 
the [accused] to the ground after they heard the 
word “gun” shouted out by a fellow officer was 
made in a volatile and rapidly evolving situation.  
In the circumstances, this decision was both 
eminently reasonable and a lawful exercise of 
the officers’ common law detention power. 
[para. 6]
Finally, the trial judge did not err in finding  that the 
subsequent handcuffing  and search of the accused 
were carried out pursuant to the police common law 
power of investigative detention. The police conduct 
in this case did not breach ss. 8  or 9 of the Charter. 
The accused’s conviction appeal was  dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Byfield, 2012 ONSC 2781
Circumstances Justifying Byfield’s 
detention & triggering the cascading 
events:
1. He had a surprised or shocked look on his face 
when he first saw the police;
2. He then avoided eye contact with the police, when 
he walked past;
3. He shifted the right side of his body away from the 
police, pulling his right shoulder back and 
quickening his pace;
4. He moved his right hand to his waist area and 
adjusted something near the right side of his groin;
5. He  was coming out of a building where there had 
been a shooting in the previous week and it was in 
a high crime area;
6. After reaching the taxi, he was very nervous and 
continued to keep the right side of his body away 
from the officer;
7. As he opened the taxi door and went to get in, 
the officer saw a bulge at his waist, underneath his 
baggy over-shirt; and
8. Another officer approached and told the officer to 
“check his waistband”.
What the trial judge said:
Some of the above circumstances relied on by the 
police, had they stood alone, would be neutral. For 
example, the fact that Byfield avoided eye contact, 
walked away, and was nervous cannot carry much 
incr iminating weight. However, the other 
circumstances provided “objective grounds” and a 
“demonstrable rationale” for belief that the accused 
was “possibly” armed with a concealed weapon. 
Furthermore, the officers’ impressions or conclusions 
were supported by objective facts and by their 
training.  It is the “totality” or the “whole” of the 
facts relied on by the officers that must be 
assessed, rather than dissecting each observation in 
isolation.
I am satisfied that the totality of the 
eight circumstances relied on by [the 
officer] amounted to “reasonable 
suspicion”, at common law, justifying a 
brief detention and a pat search for 
weapons.  ... [paras. 80-81]
see R. v. Byfield, 2012 ONSC 2781
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In July 2013  Statistics Canada 
released its “Police reported 
crime statistics in  Canada, 
2012” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• there  were 1,949,160 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2012; this 
represents 35,630 fewer crimes reported when 
compared to 2011.
• the total crime rate dropped -3%. This includes a 
violent crime rate  drop  of -3% and a property 
crime rate drop of -3%.
YK
T-156.7
V-163.9
NV-153.8
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-139.0 
V-134.0
NV-140.6
AB
T-85.6
V-88.0
NV-84.5
BC
T-93.4
V-89.3
NV-94.6
QC
T-70.7
V-75.3
NV-68.9
ON
T-58.4
V-69.5
NV-54.3
MB
T-112.4
V-153.7
NV-97.2
NWT
T-341.0
V-356.6
NV-334.6
NU
T-325.6
V-470.5
NV-272.2
NB
T-68.4
V-65.7
NV-69.3
NF
T-69.6
V-65.9
NV-70.8
NS
T-76.5
V-78.0
NV-75.8
PEI
T-72.6
V-45.1
NV-82.5
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2011 to 2012
SK 725 7,834 +7%
AB 417 16,156 -5%
NF 361 1,852 +1%
PEI 329 480 -33%
BC 311 14,395 -24%
MB 297 3,761 -7%
NB 288 2,176 -3%
NS 284 2,693 -13%
QC 206 16,575 -2%
ON 127 17,169 -1%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violent CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2013, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2012”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 23, 2013.
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YK
20,717
+1%
MB
8,809
-2%
SK
11,513
-7%
AB
7,262
-2%
BC
7,727
-2%
NWT
48,052
+1%
QC
4,316
-3%
ON
4,016
-4%
NF
6,196
-3%
NU
39,229
+3%
PEI
6,524
+4%
NB
5,519
+4%
NS
6,329
-2%
Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 496,781
Mischief 305,520
Administration of Justice Violations 180,652
Break and Enter 175,712
Assault-level 1 169,996
Disturb the Peace 112,513
Impaired Driving 84,483
Fraud 78,433
Theft of Motor Vehicle 77,939
Uttering Threats 70,383
Homicide
There were 543 homicides reported, 55 less than the 
previous year. Ontario had the most homicides at 
162, followed by Quebec (108), Alberta (85), and 
British Columbia (71). The Yukon reported no 
homicides while Newfoundland only reported three 
homicides followed by the Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut at five each. As for provincial or territorial 
homicide rates, Nunavut had the highest rate (14.8 
per 100,000 population) followed by the Northwest 
Territories (11.5), Manitoba (4.1), Saskatchewan (2.7) 
and Alberta (2.2). As for Census Metropolitan Areas 
(CMA’s), Thunder Bay, ON had the highest homicide 
rate at 5.8. The Canadian homicide rate was 1.6.
Canada
5,588
-3%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Thunder Bay, ON 5.8 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 2.2
Winnipeg, MB 4.1 Saskatoon, SK 2.1
Regina, SK 3.1 Gatineau, QC 1.9
Halifax, NS 2.9 London, ON 1.6
Edmonton, AB 2.7 Peterborough, ON 1.6
Saguenay, QC 2.7 Vancouver, BC 1.5
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Robbery
In 2012 there were 27,680 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 79 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia and Ontario. 
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA 
rate  of robbery in Canada (240), 
-7% lower than its 2011 rate. Kingston, 
ON had the  lowest rate (22). Three CMAs 
reported jumps of more  than 30% in robbery 
rates; Guelph, ON (+51%), St. John’s, NF (+47%) 
and Sherbrooke, QC (+32%). 
• Three CMAs reported declines in robberies of 
-30% or more; Barrie, ON (-38%), Greater 
Sudbury, ON (-36%)  and Thunder Bay, ON 
(-30%).
Break and Enter
In 2012 there were 175,712 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 504 break-ins per 
100,000 people. The Nunavut had 
the highest break-in rate (1,846) 
followed by Northwest Territories (1,520). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2011 to 2012
MB 168 2,130 -5%
SK 96 1,036 -7%
BC 98 4,508 -1%
ON 79 10,736 -8%
QC 72 5,783 -15%
AB 69 2,675 -11%
NS 46 441 -6%
YK 30 11 -17%
NU 18 6 -50%
NWT 53 23 +56%
NF 28 142 +29%
NB 22 164 +18%
PEI 17 25 +47%
CANADA 79 27,680 -8%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 240 Toronto, ON 118
Saskatoon, SK 162 Thunder Bay, ON 100
Vancouver, BC 132 Edmonton, AB 96
Regina, SK 124 Kelowna, BC 88
Montreal, QC 119 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 88
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2010 to 2011
NU 1,846 622 +14%
NWT 1,520 659 -11%
SK 790 8,532 -8%
MB 731 9,263 -1%
BC 650 30,028 no change
QC 573 46,125 -9%
PEI 571 834 +20%
YK 568 205 +5%
NF 545 2,792 -11%
NS 508 4,824 +1%
AB 499 19,343 +2%
NB 480 3,630 +7%
ON 362 48,855 -5%
CANADA 504 175,712 -4%
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• Break-ins accounted for about 15% of all 
property crimes.
• Break-ins dropped -4% from the previous year.
• There was one break-in every three (3) minutes.
• Residential break-ins dropped -7% while 
business break-ins declined -11%.
• From 2002 to 2012, the break-in rate dropped by 
-43%.
• Among  CMAs, Brantford, ON reported the 
highest break-in rate (743)  while Toronto reported 
the lowest (256). Only four CMA’s reported 
double digit increases in their break-in rate  - 
Brantford, ON (+21%), Moncton, NB (+17%), 
Kelowna, BC (+14%)  and Guelph, ON (+10%)  - 
while 10 CMA’s all reported double digit drops 
including  Thunder Bay, ON (-30%), Halifax, NS 
(-21%), Greater Sudbury, ON (-21%), Trois 
Rivieres, QC (-20%), Quebec, QC (-20%), 
Kingston, ON (-19%), Saguenay, QC (-17%), 
Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-12%), Regina, SK 
(-11%) and London, ON (-10%).
Drugs
In 2012 there were 109,455 
drug-related offences coming  to 
the attention of police. These 
offences included possession, 
trafficking, production 
or distribution. 
• possession offences 
accounted for 75,937 of 
these crimes - cannabis 
(57,429); cocaine (7,847); 
and other drugs (10,661). 
Other drugs include 
heroin, crystal meth, and ecstasy.
• Trafficking, production, and 
distribution offences totaled 
33,518  - cannabis (15,674); 
cocaine (10,553); and other 
drugs (7,291).
• British Columbia had the 
highest drug  related offence 
rates of all 10 provinces for cannabis while 
Saskatchewan topped the list for cocaine and 
Prince Edward Island was tops for other drugs.
• The territories continue to have some of the 
highest drug-related crime rates in Canada.
• Overall, drug  offences were down in 2012 (-5%) 
from 2011.
Top Ten CMA Break-in Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Brantford, ON 743 Winnipeg, MB 644
St. John’s, NL 717 Trois-Rivieres, QC 599
Vancouver, BC 696 Greater Sudbury, ON 596
Regina, SK 679 Gatineau, QC 578
Saskatoon, SK 657 London, ON 589
10%
76%
14%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Possession Offences       
by Drug Type
31%
47%
22%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Trafficking, Production  & Distribution 
Offences by Drug Type
Drug-related Crime Rates by Province
per 100,000 population
Province Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
BC 382 94 74
SK 319 172 72
NS 251 37 49
AB 191 77 35
QC 184 26 64
NB 172 36 49
NF 167 41 68
ON 164 38 42
MB 153 78 30
PEI 127 27 86
Territory Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
NWT 1,061 238 72
NU 1,148 18 42
YK 343 141 42
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Motor Vehicle Theft
In 2012 there were 77,939 motor vehicle thefts 
reported to police, down -7% from 2011 and down 
-57% from a decade ago.
• on average there was one motor vehicle theft 
every seven minutes.
• the motor vehicle theft rate was 223 per 100,000 
population.
• the most vehicles reported stolen was in Quebec 
(20,820)  while the Yukon had the fewest vehicles 
stolen (147).
• Most CMAs reported declines in motor vehicle 
thefts. Several reported double digit decreases 
including  Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-38%), 
Saskatoon, SK (-37%), Thunder Bay, ON (-31%), 
Saguenay, QC (-25%), Guelph, ON (-23%), Trois-
Rivieres, QC (-20%), Brantford, ON (-19%), 
Barrie, ON (-18%), Kitchener-Cambridge-
Waterloo, ON (-17%) and St. John’s, NF (-15%).  
• Eight CMAs saw an increase in their motor 
vehicle theft rates; Windsor, ON (+30%), 
Peterborough, ON (+14%), Greater Sudbury, ON 
(+12%), Ottawa, ON (+9%), Kingston, ON 
(+2%), and Calgary, AB, Victoria, BC and 
London, ON all +1%.
????	 ???????	 ????	 ?????	 
???????
On December 13, 2012 the Insurance Bureau of 
Canada released its annual list of the most frequently 
stolen vehicles in Canada. According  to the report 
there  is an increasing  involvement of organized 
crime in auto theft as evidenced by the appearance 
of all-terrain vehicles on the list. 
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada www.ibc.ca
Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts
Province/
Territory
Rate Motor Vehicle 
Thefts
Rate change 
2011 to 2012
NU 466 157 +5%
NWT 457 198 -7%
YK 407 147 +25%
SK 401 4,327 -15%
AB 356 13,799 -1%
MB 294 3,725 -5%
BC 272 12,584 -5%
QC 258 20,820 -8%
NB 151 1,143 -6%
ON 141 19,047 -9%
NS 140 1,327 +2%
PEI 109 159 +28%
NF 99 506 -15%
CANADA 223 77,939 -7%
Top Ten CMA Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Regina, SK 473 Calgary, AB 323
Kelowna, BC 433 Hamilton, ON 318
Brantford, ON 423 Montreal, QC 312
Saskatoon, Sk 364 Winnipeg, MB 301
Edmonton,  AB 326 Vancouver, BC 294
TOP 10 STOLEN AUTOS - Canada 2012
YR MAKE MODEL
1 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
2 1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
3 2006 Chevrolet TrailBlazer SS 4-door 4WD
4 2007 Ford F350 SD 4WD PU
5 2005 Cadillac Escalade 4-door AWD
6 2006 Ford F350 SD 4WD PU
7 2002 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD
8 2005 Ford F350 SD 4WD PU
9 2004 Ford F350 SD 4WD PU
10 1999 Acura Integra 2-door
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R. v. Mitchell, 2013 MBCA 44
At about 2:00 am a police officer 
pulled a vehicle over after seeing  it 
being  driven without its headlights 
on.   The accused was driving  and 
there  were three passengers. The 
officer noted the accused had “slightly glassy eyes” 
and there was a “smell ... of alcohol from inside the 
vehicle.” When asked if he  had any alcohol to drink, 
the accused said, “Yeah, a couple of beers at a 
friend’s house, earlier.”  But the officer did not ask 
when the accused had been drinking, whether the 
passengers in the vehicle had been drinking  nor 
when the drinking  had begun or stopped. An 
approved screening  device (ASD) demand under s. 
254(2) of the Criminal Code  was made and the 
accused failed at the roadside. He was arrested and 
a breathalyzer demand was given. He was taken to 
the police  station and readings of 110mg% were 
obtained. He was charged with driving over 80mg%
Manitoba Provincial Court
The trial judge found that the accused’s 
s. 8 Charter  rights had been breached 
because  the threshold for a  reasonable 
suspicion under s. 254(2) (ASD demand), 
although very low, was not satisfied by 
the simple admission of having  consumed alcohol. 
In his view, the officer should have done a more 
thorough investigation.  “Absent the accused’s 
admission that he  had consumed alcohol at some 
point on that particular day, it is very difficult for the 
court to draw the conclusion ... subjectively, that the 
officer should have had reasonable suspicion this 
individual had alcohol in his body at the material 
time,” he said. “The observations of the officer at the 
time of the stop required, at least in my view, a 
further investigation and not ... the decision of the 
officer to leap directly to an approved screening 
device  because there was alcohol somewhere within 
that automobile.” The judge nevertheless admitted 
the breath samples under s. 24(2) and convicted the 
accused of driving while over 80mg%.
 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal judge agreed that the 
accused’s s. 8 Charter rights had been 
breached and the officer could have done 
a better investigation by making  enquiries 
into his drinking  history. “The smell of alcohol from 
inside the vehicle could clearly have been coming 
from its other occupants with [the accused] simply 
acting  as the designated driver,” said the appeal 
judge. “This must all be evaluated in the context of 
the constable’s stopping  the vehicle, attending  at the 
driver’s window, securing  [the accused’s] driver’s 
license/vehicle registration, and making  the 
determination to conduct the ASD test all within the 
passage of three minutes or less.” The appeal judge, 
however, excluded the breath samples as evidence 
and entered an acquittal.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown contended that the trial 
judge and the appeal judge both 
erred in finding  that the  accused’s 
s. 8  rights had been breached. In 
its view, the accused’s admission of alcohol 
consumption by itself was sufficient to provide 
objective grounds for an ASD demand and that there 
was no requirement to do a follow-up investigation 
about drinking  history. In addition, the Crown 
submitted the officer had more than a mere 
admission of alcohol consumption. The vehicle did 
not have its lights on and there was an odour of 
alcohol emanating  from it. The accused, on the other 
hand, suggested that when he said he had two beers 
earlier, his answer was a qualified, ambiguous one. 
Without further clarification as to when he was 
drinking  or other indicia of consumption, there were 
insufficient grounds to justify the ASD demand.
After considering  the important investigatory 
function and purpose of the ASD, Justice Monnin, 
writing  the Court of Appeal’s opinion, considered 
the meaning  of the  words “reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a person has alcohol … in their body” 
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as found in s. 254(2). Citing  earlier case law, Justice 
Monnin noted the following:
• There are two components to reasonable 
grounds – whether the police officer had a 
subjective belief, honestly  held, that he had 
reasonable  grounds to demand a breath 
sample and whether a reasonable person in 
the position of the  police officer would 
conclude that there were reasonable grounds 
for the demand;
• In weighing  the evidence, the court should 
take  into account the totality of the 
circumstances known to the  police officer 
and should not examine and test each piece 
of evidence and each factor individually;
• The question is not whether the facts, 
circumstances and inferences ultimately 
prove to be true, but whether it was 
reasonable for the police officer to believe, at 
the time, that the facts and circumstances 
were true, to draw the inferences that were 
drawn and to rely on them at the time of the 
breathalyzer demand;
• Reasonable grounds to suspect is a less 
demanding  standard than reasonable grounds 
to believe;
• Reasonable suspicion requires only that the 
belief be one of a number of possible 
conclusions based on the supporting  facts, 
not a probability. 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal found there was 
more than the mere admission of alcohol 
consumption by the on which to assess the objective 
element of a reasonable suspicion under s. 254(2): 
I am not prepared to go as far as saying that a 
simple admission of alcohol consumption by a 
driver is, in and of itself, sufficient to provide 
reasonable grounds on which to base an ASD 
demand, as each case must be considered on its 
own facts.  From a common sense perspective, 
however, it would be rare, if ever, that there 
would be an admission of alcohol consumption 
with nothing else – i.e., evidence as to why the 
vehicle was stopped, when (especially the time 
of the day and of the year) and where it was 
stopped, what was the driver’s condition, how 
did he or she react to the police, what were the 
driver’s exact words and how were they spoken, 
etc.  These are all important factors to take into 
account. It is important to remember that it is the 
totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer, viewed together, that must be considered 
in determining whether there was a reasonable 
basis for his or her suspicion.  Each indicia or 
piece of evidence is not to be examined in 
isolation. 
“It is important to remember that it is the totality of the circumstances known to the officer, 
viewed together, that must be considered in determining whether there was a reasonable 
basis for his or her suspicion. Each indicia or piece of evidence is not to be examined in 
isolation.” 
BY THE BOOK:
???????	 ???	 ????????	 ??	 ???????? Criminal Code
s.  254(2) If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or 
a drug  in their body and that the person has, 
within the preceding  three hours, operated  a 
motor vehicle or vessel,  operated  or assisted in 
the operation of an aircraft or railway equipment or had the 
care or control of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or 
railway equipment,  whether it was in motion or not, the 
peace officer may, by demand, require the person to 
comply with paragraph (a), in the case of  a drug, or with 
either or both of paragraphs (a) and  (b),  in the case of 
alcohol:
(b)  to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in the 
peace officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis  to be 
made by means of an approved screening  device and, if 
necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.
...
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In this case, the trial judge might have found the 
manner in which the officer conducted his 
investigation to be wanting, but the facts remain 
that the accused was driving at night, on a busy 
thoroughfare, without lights, that there was an 
odour of alcohol emanating  from the car and the 
accused, in answer to a legitimate question in 
the circumstances, acknowledged that he had 
consumed alcohol. ...   Both the trial judge and 
the appeal judge erred by focussing on the 
words of the accused’s admission without 
considering them in the context of all of the 
evidence known to the officer. In so doing, each 
misapplied the applicable legal principles, 
thereby committing an error of law. In my view, 
after considering all of the evidence known to 
the officer, he had reasonable grounds to make 
the ASD demand when he did. It was an error in 
law by the appeal judge to find otherwise.
 
For the reasons I have already stated, rarely will 
there be a need for a police officer to obtain an 
alcohol consumption history from a driver. That 
is not what the legislation requires or what was 
intended by it. As explained earlier, the purpose 
of s. 254(2) is to provide an investigative tool 
that briefly detains a driver with minimum 
inconvenience and intrusion. [paras. 35-37]
 
The appeal judge erred in finding  a s. 8 Charter 
breach. The police met the statutory “reasonable 
suspicion” standard for making  the ASD demand. 
The accused’s conviction at trial for driving  over 
80mg% was reinstated. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Punishment is the last and the least effective 
instrument in  the hands of the legislator for the 
prevention of crime.” - John Ruskin
????????????	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R. v. Fortune, 2013 ONCA 421
A p o l i c e o f f i c e r r e c e i v e d 
information from a number of 
confidential informants and one 
anonymous tipster that the accused 
was se l l ing  heroin f rom his 
residence. A telewarrant under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA)  was applied for and 
granted. The ITO covered a nine month period and 
included information about several heroin purchases 
from the accused at his residence. Each of the 
informants was a heroin user or addict with previous 
convictions and a familiarity with the drug  trade. At 
least two of them had provided information to 
police on prior occasions which resulted in the 
arrests of several people and a conviction of one of 
those arrested for a trafficking  offence involving 
heroin. As well, the ITO contained information from 
another confidential informant and an anonymous 
tipster that the accused and his girlfriend were 
selling  heroin from their apartment in August 2009. 
This information was consistent with previous 
source information so police surveilled the 
accused’s residence. Shortly after a suspected heroin 
supplier met with the accused, vehicular and foot 
traffic to his residence increased with visitors 
remaining  for only a few minutes. Upon executing 
the warrant, police  located 4.39 grams of heroin, 
over $3,000 cash and trafficking  paraphernalia, 
including  a scale, tin foil and nearly six dozen 
baggies.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused challenged the validity of 
the search warrant arguing  there was 
insufficient information upon which the 
justice of the peace (JP) could have 
granted the warrant. The judge, noting  that he was 
not to substitute his own view for that of the issuing 
JP, found there was reliable evidence  in ITO that 
might reasonably be believed and sufficient to 
support the granting  of the search warrant for heroin 
was in the residence. The accused was convicted of 
British Columbia Police & Peace 
Officers’ Memorial Service
Sunday, September 29th, 2013
British Columbia Legislature
Victoria, BC
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possessing  heroin for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing  proceeds of crime. He was sentenced to 
two years less a  day and probation for three  years, a 
10-year weapons prohibition and forfeiture of the 
money and drug paraphernalia seized.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the ITO 
only supported a reasonable 
suspicion that heroin might be 
present in his home and did not 
rise to the level of a credibly-based probability, the 
standard required for the issuance of a  CDSA search 
warrant. In his view, (1) his reputation as a suspected 
heroin dealer, (2)  the appearance of an alleged but 
unconfirmed heroin supplier at his home and (3) 
increased vehicular and foot traffic  at his home after 
the alleged heroin supplier left were, neither alone 
nor in combination, sufficient factors capable of 
establishing  the credibly-based probability that 
heroin would be found. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. 
“The ITO included information from four different 
confidential informants, as well as an anonymous 
tipster, along  with the results of various police 
investigations and physical surveillance of the 
[ a c c u s e d ’s ] r e s i d e n c e a n d a c t i v i t i e s 
contemporaneous with his arrest on August 26, 
2009,” said the Court. “[I]t was open to the justice of 
the peace to conclude from a consideration of the 
contents of the redacted ITO, together with 
reasonable inferences arising  from that information, 
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
the [accused] was trafficking  in heroin from his 
residence on August 26, 2009, and that a search of 
the premises would yield the drug, assorted 
paraphernalia associated with trafficking, and the 
proceeds of trafficking  activity.” The reviewing  judge 
properly concluded that the ITO contained sufficient 
reliable  information on the basis of which the 
telewarrant could have issued, the search did not 
breach s. 8 of the  Charter and the items seized were 
properly admitted in evidence. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Benham, 2013 BCCA 276
After a 35-year-old woman was 
found strangled in her home, the 
accused was arrested for murder, but 
la ter re leased without being 
charged. The deceased and the 
accused had a daughter together and were living 
with each other (along  with the accused’s father) for 
a month following  a lengthy separation. Although 
not charged with murder, the accused was charged 
with breaching  a provision of an undertaking  for 
having  contact with the deceased.  The undertaking 
pertained to charges of assault that had been laid 
against the  accused several months earlier. He plead 
guilty to the breach charge, was given a short seven 
day jail sentence and reported to a probation officer 
upon his release. The probation officer told the 
accused that she wished to review the bail order and 
the peace bond with him, and asked him why he 
had breached the no-contact order by attending  the 
deceased’s residence.  He told the probation officer 
that he had gone to his daughter’s birthday party, 
decided to stay overnight (which was demonstrably 
untrue because he was living  there)  and, when he 
woke in the morning, he found the woman dead 
beside him on the bed.  He also told the  probation 
officer that he took his daughter into another room 
to watch a video and asked his father to call 
paramedics and police.  He was subsequently 
charged with first degree murder.
British Columbia Supreme Court
During  a  voir dire to determine the 
admissibility of the accused’s statement 
to the probation officer, the judge ruled 
that the probation officer was not a 
person in authority such that the Crown was 
required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the statement was voluntary.  In the judge’s view, 
there was no evidence as to the accused’s 
understanding  of the probation officer’s role nor 
whether he believed she had some ability  to 
influence the investigation or prosecution of a 
murder charge.  
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At the time the statement was made, the accused 
was not charged with murder nor did the probation 
officer play a role in the investigation or prosecution 
of any crimes other than the breaches. Furthermore, 
even if the probation officer was a person in 
authority, the statement was nonetheless voluntary. 
There were no inducements (threats or promises)  nor 
any oppressive  circumstances. As well, when the 
accused made his statement he was not charged 
with murder, the probation officer was not 
conducting  an interview in relation to the death and 
the accused was aware of his rights because he had 
talked to his lawyer and received advice. The judge 
also found the accused “clearly had an operating 
mind.”  The Crown had proven voluntariness beyond 
a reasonable doubt and the statement was 
admissible. As a result of this evidence, along  with 
other circumstantial evidence including  significant 
forensic evidence, the accused was convicted of 
second degree murder. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused contended, among 
other grounds, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting  his statement 
made to the probation officer. In his 
view, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the 
fact that he subjectively believed he was required to 
answer the probation officer’s questions and that he 
believed she had a role to play in the murder 
investigation and prosecution. Since he was not told 
he was free to refuse to answer the  probation 
officer’s questions, he suggested a reasonable  doubt 
existed about whether his responses were 
voluntary. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. 
Justice Frankel, writing  the Court’s opinion, first 
found it unnecessary to determine whether the 
probation officer was a person in authority. 
Assuming  she was, the trial judge did not err in 
finding  the accused’s statement voluntary. Provided 
judges properly instruct themselves on the law 
regarding  voluntarines and the factors to consider in 
determining  the issue, they are owed considerable 
deference to their findings. In this case, the Court of 
Appeal was not entitled to re-weigh the evidence 
and come to a  different conclusion. The trial judge’s 
findings were open to her on the evidence.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
???????????	 ??????
?????????	 ?????	 ????	 
???????	 ??????????	 ??????	 
R. v. Jones, 2013 BCCA 345
A mother called 911 and asked for 
an ambulance after her visiting 
daughter, who was bipolar, refused 
to leave the  house when asked to do 
so. While her daughter remained in 
the house, the mother went outside  and waited in 
her vehicle  for the ambulance to arrive. The 
ambulance requested police attendance. An officer 
was dispatched to a “mental health issue between a 
daughter and a mother” and told the daughter was 
“freaking  out.” When the officer arrived, the mother 
was outside sitting  in her vehicle. She confirmed her 
daughter was the only person in the house. She said 
her daughter was upstairs “freaking  out” and wanted 
her removed. She gave the officer a  key to the 
residence and waited in her vehicle. She did not 
give the officer permission to search the house and, 
if asked, would have  refused entry for that purpose. 
The officer waited five minutes for back-up  and 
nothing untoward was noted during this time. 
The officer entered the house and saw the daughter 
sitting  on the stairs. She was quite passive and left 
the residence when asked without incident. When 
asked if anyone else was in the house, she said no. 
When it became clear the officer intended to look 
around in the house she told him her mother would 
not want him to do so and he should ask her 
permission. Although there was no indication of 
criminal activity or the presence of someone else in 
the house, the officer decided to search the 
residence because  (1) there was a policy  to enter at 
911 calls and clear the residence, making  sure the 
situation was fully investigated and (2)  to ensure that 
everything  was “all right” and there was no one else 
in the residence who was either injured or in 
distress. During  the 15-minute search, the officer 
found a marihuana grow operation contained in 
three  rooms of the  house. A warrant was obtained 
and executed. Police recovered 413  marihuana 
plants and 788 grams of dried marihuana. The 
mother (accused) was subsequently charged with 
drug offences.
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British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued that the warrantless 
search of her home breached her s. 8 
Charter rights. The Crown, on the other 
hand, submitted (1)  the police had 
express or implied permission to enter and search 
the residence, (2) under the circumstances the 
accused had no reasonable  expectation of privacy 
and (3)  the search was justified under the general 
common law power that enables the police  to 
search premises without a warrant where there are 
public safety concerns. The trial judge rejected the 
Crown’s first two suggestions. The accused had not 
given the police permission to search her home, 
only  access limited to locating  and removing  her 
daughter. Once this was accomplished, the accused 
maintained her expectation of privacy within her 
home. The judge did, however, find that police 
could forcibly enter a private dwelling  where  there 
were safety concerns regarding  the occupants or the 
public. Although not every 911 call will lead to a 
situation in which the police have  the authority to 
search a residence, in the circumstances of this case, 
the judge found the officer’s actions were 
reasonable. The judge said he “was justified in 
continuing  a search of the premises to determine 
that there were no other persons involved in the 
situation who needed assistance, and that there  were 
no other hazards in the house that had occurred as a 
result of the  mental health episode that the accused 
said had occurred.” The evidence was admissible 
and the accused was convicted of producing 
marihuana and possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the trial 
judge’s ruling. She argued the 
search of her residence was not 
justified by the common law police 
power to conduct searches related to public safety 
concerns. In her view, the standard for determining 
whether the officer’s entry into her home was 
justified was objective; it must be both necessary 
and reasonable  for public protection. She suggested 
that the trial judge applied a lower standard - a 
“possibility” of a public safety risk relying  only on 
the officer’s subjective view of risk, not an objective 
view. There was no evidence that anyone else  was in 
the home, injured or needed assistance. The Crown, 
to the contrary, asserted that the officer acted within 
the permissible scope of his duties. He was not 
required to be certain of a risk before entering. In its 
opinion, lack of information may be a compelling 
reason to justify police entry and the officer’s search 
was minimally intrusive. He entered only to see if 
anyone needed help, did not use force and his 
search was quick and efficient.
Forcible Entry
Citing  the  Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in R. 
v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311, Justice Neilson, 
speaking  for the Court of Appeal, noted “the police 
have a common law duty to protect the public from 
health and safety risks in responding  to [911] 
emergency calls, and the performance of that duty 
may, in some circumstances, permit them to forcibly 
enter and search private  premises without authority.” 
However, whether a  warrantless search is justified 
will depend on the circumstances of the individual 
case. Although Justice Neilson acknowledged that 
the importance of protecting  life  and safety will 
require the police to err on the side of caution, the 
correct standard to apply is objective. There must be 
a reasonable basis for a police officer’s subjective 
belief that a public safety concern requires a search. 
In this case, the trial judge erred in holding  that 
there  was an objective  basis to support the officer’s 
search:
• There was no suggestion of criminal activity in 
the 911 call - an ambulance, not police, was 
requested;
• The call did not reveal any precise safety threat 
or risk. The information ‒ a “mental health 
issue” and a daughter “freaking  out” ‒ was 
nebulous. 
• Nothing  on the officer’s arrival indicated 
exigent circumstances. He waited several 
minutes for back-up  to arrive and, during  that 
time, neither saw nor heard anything  to 
indicate immediate action was required.
• When the officer approached the house, no 
mental health risk  emerged. He immediately 
located the daughter just inside the front door 
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and observed nothing  else of concern in the 
house. She was passive and cooperative, came 
out without protest, answered his questions 
lucidly and told him her mother would not 
want him to search the house.
• Several “possibilities” enumerated by the trial 
judge to justify the search were speculative and 
there  was no evidence to objectively support 
them. These possibilities included (1)  there may 
have been other persons involved or something 
untoward happening  upstairs, (2) she could 
have been making  plans to harm herself and 
had only been interrupted by the officer 
entering  the premises or (3)  she could have 
been in the process of creating  a hazard, such 
as setting  fire to the premises, which would 
have created a dangerous situation for both 
herself and anyone else who might have 
re‑entered the premises.  
• Although the limited information initially 
available to the officer did not eliminate the 
potential that this was a grave  and volatile 
mental health situation, within minutes of his 
arrival the si tuation was signif icantly 
transformed. The daughter was not “freaking 
out” or volatile, ambulance personnel were 
present or en route  to handle  any mental health 
concerns and the accused, while upset, was 
secluded from her daughter and secure in her 
car.
Once the officer located the 911 caller (the 
accused), determined the reason for her call, and 
provided the requested assistance by removing  her 
daughter, his authority to be in the house ended. 
Plus, the trial judge failed to consider alternatives 
available to the officer before he decided to search 
further in an effort to ensure “everything  was all 
right”. He could have waited until the accused 
calmed and then questioned her and her daughter 
about the events leading  up to the 911 call. Or he 
could have asked the accused to enter the residence 
and ensure all was well, and then arranged for the 
daughter to leave the area in whatever manner was 
appropriate. 
In this case, there was no objective indicia  of 
criminal activity  or an identifiable threat to public 
safety in the 911 call or the circumstances that 
greeted the police on their arrival, such as the 
presence of a gun or other weapon, an assault or 
other injury, or an injury related to an operating  drug 
lab. The absence of such concrete indicators of 
crime or threat to public safety did not justify an 
immediate  search to “make sure everything  was all 
right”. The search was not a  necessary and 
reasonable violation of the accused’s rights under 
s. 8 of the Charter.
On a final note, the Court of Appeal recognized that 
the reasonableness of police action will be factually 
driven and any such analysis involves weighing 
privacy interests against public safety: 
I acknowledge the Crown’s submission that 
allowing this appeal may have a chilling  effect 
on police response to public safety concerns 
arising from 9-1-1 calls. I also recognize the 
difficulties these situations present to the police 
in that they require rapid judgment calls in 
situations where all the circumstances are not 
known, whereas the courts examine them in a 
tranquil setting with the benefit of hindsight. As 
a result, I agree it is appropriate to err on the 
side of caution in permitting a citizen’s privacy 
rights to trump the objectives of public 
protection and safety. Nevertheless, not every 
9-1-1 call engages issues of public protection, 
and the requirement that a search be both 
reasonable and necessary does not constitute an 
unwarranted interference with the duty of police 
to protect the public. It remains to analyze each 
situation on its own facts in an effort to balance 
these competing interests. [para. 42]
Admissibility
The Court of Appeal excluded the evidence under s. 
24(2) of the Charter. Although the marihuana plants 
and product seized by police  were highly reliable 
evidence and society had a significant interest in 
having  the case adjudicated on its merits, the s. 8 
breach was serious, the intrusion into the accused’s 
home had a significant impact on her Charter-
protected privacy rights.  Without the evidence, the 
Crown’s case collapsed. The accused’s appeal was 
allowed, her convictions set aside and acquittals 
were entered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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R. v. McCammon, 2013 MBCA 68
At about 2:00 am two patrol officers 
saw the accused’s vehicle  on a road 
leading  to a  park on the outskirts of 
the city. The officers thought the 
vehicle was suspicious, being  in the 
area late  at night, and pulled it over. A computer 
check revealed the vehicle  had not been reported 
stolen. An officer asked the driver what she was 
doing  in the park at that time. The officer learned she 
had been drinking  and asked her to provide a breath 
sample into an approved screening  device. She 
failed the test and was arrested. She was taken back 
to the police station, provided breath samples over 
the legal limit and was charged with driving  over 
80mg%. 
Manitoba Provincial Court
The trial judge ruled that the true purpose 
of the traffic  stop was to check for 
suspicious activity and not for reasons 
related to road safety. It was a car being 
driven late at night in an area where there  were not 
a lot of vehicles around. In his view, the officer 
could not rely on the provisions of Manitoba’s 
Highway Traffic Act (s. 76.1)  as authority for the stop. 
Since there  was no other lawful basis for the stop, it 
was arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter. The 
breath samples were excluded under s. 24(2)  and 
the accused was acquitted.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown argued, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in finding  no lawful basis for 
the vehicle stop and therefore  a s. 9 
breach occurred. The appeal judge noted 
that motor vehicle stops do not have to be based 
upon suspicion of a  driving  infraction, but can be 
completely random as long  as the purpose for the 
stop  is related to road safety. The validity of such a 
detention, however, must be assessed at the front-
end of the stop  - what motivated it to begin with. A 
stop  will not be rendered valid simply because the 
police  pursue highway safety issues once the 
accused is detained, such as asking  for a driver’s 
licence and vehicle registration. In this case, the 
appeal judge found the  trial judge’s ruling  that the 
true purpose of the stop  - to investigate general 
suspicion about criminal activity - was not 
unreasonable. The decision to exclude the evidence 
was upheld and the Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown sought leave to appeal before 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal. But  
Justice Monnin agreed that the trial 
judge’s finding  was not unreasonable. 
The purpose of the stop was not related to highway 
safety but rather to rule  out or investigate a  general 
suspicion of criminal behaviour. “Highway traffic 
stop  authority  cannot be a means to conduct an 
unfounded general inquisition or a comprehensive 
check for criminal activity,” he said. The police 
cannot validate an otherwise illegal stop by  pursuing 
highway safety issues once an accused is detained. 
He also found the Crown’s argument that the court 
should focus on the officers’ actions or conduct, 
rather than their suspicions and thoughts, was ill-
conceived. “The trial judge was entitled to assess the 
police officers’ evidence as to the reasons motivating 
the stop in order to assess whether there was a 
genuine highway traffic interest in the stop,” he said. 
There was no error in finding  that highway traffic 
concerns were not the motivation for the stop and it 
was not justified on any other basis, thus a s. 9 
Charter breach. As for the exclusion of evidence, the 
appropriate factors were considered in the s. 24(2) 
analysis which was entitled to deference.  The 
Crown’s application for leave to appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v. Evon, 2013 ONCA 10
 
At 10:30 pm police received a lengthy 
911 call of shots being  fired and 
flashes being  seen near the accused’s 
residence. The  911 call referred to 
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three  males and three females in the area. Only the 
accused was identified by name. Several police units 
responded to the call. Most were members of the 
Emergency Services Unit whose duties include 
attending  high risk  calls. The accused was known to 
all of them either through past contact or from 
police intelligence. Three males were found in front 
of the residence and three females were leaving  the 
area. The males were directed at gunpoint to stop 
and get on the ground. They were  detained and 
patted down. No firearm was located but police 
continued to be concerned that there might be a 
gunman or injured person in the residence so they 
entered it at 10:50 pm. When searching  any place 
where  a person could be hiding, an officer saw 
drugs and drug  paraphernalia in plain view in a 
bedroom. In another bedroom, another officer 
noticed a duct taped package on a shelf. He initially 
thought it was a kilogram of cocaine but, after 
picking  it up  and looking  at it, concluded it was a 
bundle of money. He returned the bundle to the 
shelf. The officers exited the house at 11:00 pm and 
sought and executed a telewarrant the following 
morning. Cash, bear spray and drugs, including 
crack cocaine, powder cocaine, ecstasy, Oxycodone 
and Morphine were seized. The accused was 
charged with several drug, weapon, property and 
proceeds of crime offences.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the initial entry into the 
house was unreasonable and that this 
tainted the telewarrant. The judge, 
however, found the  investigation of the  911 call fell 
within the  general scope of police powers and was 
justified in the circumstances. “I found that the 
police concerns were for an unknown injured 
person or an unknown person with a  firearm,” he 
said. “The basis for the concern was information 
obtained from a 911 caller. The relevant portions of 
that call had been confirmed. In my view, the police 
decision to enter the residence was well grounded 
both subjectively  and objectively.” As for the 
telewarrant, it was properly issued despite a 
misleading  statement and some material omissions. 
The accused was convicted on many of the charges.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The accu sed appea l ed h i s 
convictions, submitting  the police 
did not have justifiable grounds to 
search the house. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed. The  trial judge’s finding  was 
amply supported by the evidence including  the 
specificity of the 911 call, the confirmation of the 
call, the accused’s reputation with police and the 
officers’ evidence. As for the officer examining  the 
package found in the house, he exceeded his 
authority during  the search. However, because the 
plain view observations of the other officer 
supported the issuance of the telewarrant, nothing 
turned on that examination.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. Evon, 
[2011] O.J. No. 6563 and R. v. Evon, [2010] O.J. 
No. 6286.
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R. v. Allison, 2013 ONCA 461
Two members of Toronto’s anti-
violence police unit (TAVIS)  went to 
an area to proactively talk with 
individuals. They wanted to ensure 
community safety because there had 
been a shooting  two days earlier and police  were 
concerned that there  may be retaliation. The 
accused, wearing  clothing  sometimes associated 
with gangs including  baggy blue jeans and a blue 
shirt, was seen riding  his bicycle about 50 metres 
from the officer’s police car.  As an officer 
approached and said “Hi,” the accused looked 
shocked and suddenly changed body language. He 
adjusted his waistband and raced away on his 
bicycle onto the sidewalk at about 30 km/h. When 
the officers pursued in their vehicle with siren and 
lights activated, the accused continued to bike away 
from them at a high rate of speed. About a minute 
later he fell over his bicycle onto the ground, 
landing  on his back. An officer said, “Show me your 
hands.” When asked why he was running, the 
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accused said he was carrying  a gun. He was 
handcuffed and patted down. Police found a  9 mm 
Ruger pistol and ammunition. He was arrested, 
advised of his right to counsel and charged with six 
firearm related offences. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought to have the handgun 
and ammunition excluded as evidence 
being  the product of ss. 8, 9 and 10 
Charter breaches. The judge found the 
accused had been detained when police 
commanded him to show his hands - a reasonable 
person in his circumstances would have concluded 
that he  had no choice  but to comply. The detention 
was arbitrary since the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was 
connected to a  particular crime. They were not 
investigating  a crime, did not associate his clothing 
to gang  activity and he discarded no contraband 
before the detention. In addition, they may have 
been mistaken about him reaching  for his 
waistband; they were chasing  him in their car as he 
fled on a bicycle. “[H]e had the right to refuse to 
answer questions or to go as he pleased,” said the 
judge. “Whether he walked rode his bicycle slowly 
or quickly should not be a deciding  factor. …  The 
decision to leave quickly, on its own, does not, in 
my view, raise reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the individual is connected to a  known or suspected 
crime. … [His] decision to leave in the manner he 
did, rather than stay and refuse to answer questions, 
does not constitute grounds for the police to detain 
him.”   The judge, however, did not find breaches of 
ss. 8 or 10. “Public safety issues required that [he] 
be searched as soon as he informed the officers that 
he had a  gun,” said the judge. As well, until the  gun 
was safely removed, the police had no reasonable 
opportunity to advise the accused of his rights.  
Despite the arbitrary detention, the evidence was 
admitted under s. 24(2). The breach was neither 
serious nor deliberate. The officers acted in good 
faith and their behavior was neither egregious nor 
abusive. They acted under exigent circumstances 
with a concern for public safety. The gun was also 
highly reliable evidence and essential to the trial. 
The accused was convicted of several weapons 
offences.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter 
ruling. The Crown, on the other 
hand, suggested that the  trial judge 
erred in finding  a s. 9 breach in the first place. In the 
Crown’s view, the police  were justified in detaining 
the accused for investigative purposes and, in any 
event, the  trial judge properly decided the s. 24(2) 
issue. The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to 
decide whether the trial judge erred in concluding 
that the accused had been arbitrarily  detained. Even 
assuming  a s. 9 breach occurred, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible under s. 24(2). 
The trial judge’s finding  that police  acted in good 
faith and their conduct was neither egregious nor 
abusive was reasonably supported by the following 
considerations taken together:
• Context: The police were patrolling  a high 
crime area where  there had been a fatal 
shooting two days earlier. 
• Change in demeanor: The accused looked 
shocked when he first saw the police.
• Police’s perception: The police believed, albeit 
apparently mistakenly, that on seeing  the 
officers the accused put his hand to his waist.
• Flight: The accused fled by bike immediately 
on seeing the police.
• Police questioning: The trial judge found the 
question “Why did you run?” innocuous.
• Period of detention:  The accused was 
detained only  briefly before telling  the police 
that he had a gun.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca   
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Allison, 2011 ONSC 1459.
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R. v Davis, 2013 ABCA 15 
A police officer was dispatched to 
investigate a report that a person 
armed with a butcher knife was 
riding  a  bicycle around a mall 
parking  lot.   The officer attended the 
area and saw a young  man, matching  the description 
given, riding  a bike. Following  the man down a 
street, the officer sounded his air  horn twice and 
activated the police car’s emergency lights. But 
before the officer could get out his car, the accused 
charged at the officer with a knife in his hand. 
Despite resistance from the  accused, the  officer was 
able to open his door and exit his car. While the 
accused held the knife over his head, the officer told 
him to back up  and drop the knife and gave an 
officer in distress signal over the radio. The accused 
picked up  his bike and walked away. The  officer, 
with revolver drawn, followed him and shouted 
many times at him to drop  the knife. He continued 
to walk away and, when he faced the officer, was 
pepper sprayed in the face with no effect. 
As the accused continued to walk away, the officer 
demanded he drop the knife while downgrading  the 
radio alert for assistance. When the accused moved 
in the direction of a mall where people had been 
seen earlier, the  officer called for a Taser. Concerned 
his options would be limited if the accused reached 
a populated area, he decided that he would not let 
him get near people while still in possession of the 
knife. When the accused turned to face the  officer 
and raised the knife in the air, he shot him twice; 
once in the neck and once in the chest. He was 
taken to hospital for treatment of his life threatening 
injuries and later charged with possessing  a weapon 
(a knife) for a dangerous purpose, assaulting  a police 
officer and assault with a weapon.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused’s Charter arguments, 
including  breaches of ss. 7 (life liberty and 
security) and 12 (cruel and unusual 
punishment) due to excessive force, were 
BY THE BOOK:
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 ?????????? Criminal Code
s.  25 (1) Every one who is required or authorized 
by law to do anything  in the administration or 
enforcement of the law
(a) as a private person,
(b) as a peace officer or public officer,
(c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or
(d) by virtue of his office,
is, if he acts on reasonable grounds,  justified in doing  what 
he is required  or authorized to do and  in using  as much 
force as is necessary for that purpose.
When not protected
(3)  Subject to subsections (4) and  (5), a person is not 
justified  for the purposes of subsection (1) in using  force 
that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous 
bodily harm unless the person believes on reasonable 
grounds that it is necessary for the self-preservation of the 
person or the preservation of any one under that person’s 
protection from death or grievous bodily harm.
When protected
(4) A peace officer, and every person lawfully assisting  the 
peace officer, is justified  in using  force that is intended  or is 
likely  to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a person to 
be arrested, if
(a)  the peace officer is proceeding  lawfully to arrest, with 
or without warrant, the person to be arrested;
(b) the offence for which the person is  to be arrested  is one 
for which that person may be arrested without warrant;
(c) the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest;
(d)  the peace officer or other person using  the force 
believes on reasonable grounds that  the force is necessary 
for the purpose of protecting  the peace officer, the person 
lawfully assisting  the peace officer or any other person 
from imminent or future death or grievous bodily  harm; 
and
(e) the flight cannot be prevented  by reasonable means in a 
less violent manner.
...
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rejected. The judge concluded that the accused bore 
the onus of demonstrating  that his Charter rights 
were breached by establishing  on a balance of 
probabilities that the requirements of s. 25 of the 
Criminal Code  had not been met. The onus was not 
on the Crown to prove the factors justifying  the use 
of force. The judge, nevertheless, did find the officer 
was justified in acting  as he did. The accused’s 
Charter rights had not been breached through the 
use of excessive force. The accused was convicted of 
all three charges and given a  suspended sentence, 
taking  into account that he had been shot and 
injured.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his convictions arguing, in 
part, that the trial judge erred in determining 
whether his Charter rights were breached. In his 
view, the shooting  was unnecessary and therefore 
excessive force was used. Contrary  to the trial 
judge’s ruling  placing  the  burden on him to 
demonstrate the officer did not act reasonably, he 
contended that once he showed force causing 
grievous harm was used by police, the evidentiary 
burden shifted to the  Crown to prove that the force 
was reasonable  in all the circumstances and thereby 
justified by  s. 25. He submitted that he met the onus 
by showing  that he suffered grievous bodily harm 
through the use of lethal force and it was now up to 
the Crown to prove that it was justified.
Who Bears the Burden?
Justices O’Brien and McDonald 
agreed that the Crown had the 
evidentiary burden of showing  that 
s. 25 had been satisfied when the 
provision is relied upon to justify the level of force 
used in these and similar circumstances. “The 
section is designed to protect those engaged in law 
enforcement from civil and criminal liability when 
they are required to use force in performing  their 
public duties,” said the majority. “It is clear, 
however, that when the section is invoked in this 
context, the burden falls on the person seeking  to 
rely on the section’s protection to prove that it 
applies.” The justices continued:
Notwithstanding that the overall burden is on 
the person alleging a Charter breach, the 
situation is similar to a civil case where the 
overal l burden l ies with the plaint i f f . 
Nonetheless, the law imposes an evidentiary 
burden on the defendant to prove the 
application of section 25, where he seeks to use 
it to justify his conduct. Although not completely 
analogous, this is also similar to the burden 
placed on the Crown in an application under 
section 8 of the Charter. Once an accused shows 
that a search was unlawful, the burden falls to 
the Crown to show that the search was 
nonetheless reasonable. This does not reverse 
the overall burden of proof on the Charter 
application, which remains with the accused. It 
just places an evidentiary burden on the Crown 
with respect to this aspect of the matter. [para. 
47]
Despite the  trial judge’s misstatement of the law, she 
nonetheless found the officer’s use of force justified 
on a subjective-objective basis and relied upon the 
principles of proportionality, necessity and 
reasonableness. She accepted the officer’s subjective 
belief that he had no other choice, at the point of the 
final confrontation, but to shoot the accused. He 
would soon reach a point where he was mingling 
with the public, putting  bystanders in danger, and 
restricting  the officer’s options to protect public 
safety. She also tested the objective nature of the 
officer’s belief and found it to be reasonable.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
A Second View
Chief Justice  Fraser, authoring  a dissenting 
opinion, agreed with the majority that the 
trial judge erred by holding  that the 
accused bore the burden of establishing 
“[I]f the police use excessive force in apprehending a person, and it results in a Charter breach, 
then the remedies available include a stay in extreme and extraordinary situations. Alternatively, 
a remedy may be given at the sentencing stage, or the misconduct may give rise to an award of 
damages.” 
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that the use of deadly force was not justified under s. 
25. Although the burden of proving  a Charter 
violation rests with the person alleging  the  breach, 
he found this does not mean that an accused must 
prove the force used was excessive. He stated:
Once an accused has met the burden of 
establishing  that the police used deadly force 
against him or her, this constitutes a prima facie 
breach of s. 7 of the Charter. The evidentiary 
burden then shifts to the Crown to prove that the 
force used was justified in the circumstances. 
The test as to whether the use of deadly force 
was justified requires a combined subjective - 
objective analysis. The trier of fact must 
conclude not only that the police officer 
subjectively believed that the use of force was 
necessary in all of the circumstances to protect 
the police officer or others from death or 
grievous bodily harm, but also that this belief 
was objectively reasonable.
This being  so, it would be unfair to impose on 
an accused the burden of proving  a negative, 
namely that the deadly force was not justified. 
Evidence of the subjective belief of the police 
officer falls squarely within the exclusive 
knowledge of the police officer and similarly, 
evidence as to what was considered reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances from an 
objective viewpoint may well be linked to police 
practices and procedures. This evidence is not 
within either the ready knowledge or control of 
an accused.
I would add a word of caution. Where an 
accused establishes a prima facie Charter 
breach, it is not proper to speak of a burden 
being imposed on the police. Those cases that 
refer to the burden shifting to the police are civil 
ones in which the police were defendants. 
However, in a criminal trial, the police are 
neither parties to a prosecution, nor defendants. 
Where an accused establishes a prima facie 
breach of s. 7 of the Charter because deadly 
force has been used against him or her, what is 
at issue is the police power of the state. The 
evidentiary burden then shifts to the Crown to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
police actions were justified in accordance with 
the limitations in s. 25 of the Code and thus in 
compliance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.
Therefore, once [the accused] established a 
prima facie breach of s. 7, the evidentiary 
burden shifted to the Crown to establish that the 
use of deadly force by the police officer 
complied with the limitations in s. 25. 
[references omitted, paras. 78-81]
Since the trial judge erred in imposing  the burden on 
the accused, she conducted  her analysis of whether 
the use of deadly  force was justified from the wrong 
perspective:
[A]t no time did the trial judge ever consider 
whether the Crown had established on a balance 
of probabilities that the police officer’s use of 
deadly force was justified at law. Reasonableness 
is not only a matter of what a judge in a calm 
and reflective environment with the benefit of 
hindsight might now think. But equally 
reasonableness is not only a matter of what the 
“Under the law, police officers are accorded a significant degree of latitude in their use of 
force to complete an arrest, and appropriately so. Courts have often stressed that police 
actions cannot be measured to a standard of perfection but must be assessed in light of the 
dangerous and exigent circumstances in which the police often find themselves. However, 
police officers do not have an unlimited right to inflict harm on a person, much less deadly 
force, in the execution of their duties. Under s. 25 of the Criminal Code, police use of force 
is “constrained by the principles of proportionality, necessity and reasonableness”. Indeed, 
because of the latitude given to the police in exercising their duties, courts must be vigilant 
in ensuring that the limitations on the police power of the state that do exist are upheld. The 
rule of law binds everyone in Canada including the police.”
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officer at the scene thought. The finality of 
deadly force demands both accessible and 
acceptable standards. As I have explained, the 
trial judge here failed to test the police officer’s 
subjective belief about the necessity for deadly 
force against the objective standard mandated by 
law. That failure means that her conclusion 
about whether the deadly force was justified 
cannot stand. [para. 97]
Justice Fraser would have ordered a new trial.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Editor’s note: This case is under appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
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 R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16
The police  obtained a general warrant 
under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code 
with a related assistance order 
requiring  Telus provide copies of any 
text message sent or received by two 
named wireless subscribers over a two week period 
that were stored on Telus’ computer database. As 
well, the warrant required the production of 
subscriber information identifying  any individuals 
who sent text messages to, or received text messages 
from, the two targeted subscribers. At the time, Telus 
would routinely make copies of all text messages 
sent or received by its subscribers and store them for 
30 days.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Telus made a motion arguing  the warrant 
was invalid because the police had failed 
to satisfy the requirement under s. 487.01
(1)(c)  that a general warrant could not be 
issued if another provision in the Criminal Code was 
available to authorize the technique used by police. 
In its view, the police should have obtained an 
authorization to intercept private communications 
and therefore a general warrant was not 
available. The Crown, on the other hand, submitted 
that the messages on Telus’ computer database were 
not real-time communications (thus their retrieval 
not an intercept). The Crown opined that the police 
were therefore permitted to use the general warrant 
power to obtain text messages stored on a service 
provider’s computer. The judge found that a general 
warrant could be used to seize the content of private 
text messages from a telecommunication service 
provider and the police had not engaged in an 
“interception.” The judge dismissed Telus’ 
application, but did rescind the part of the warrant 
requiring  production of historical messages 
predating  the issuance of the warrant because a 
production order was available to obtain them.
Supreme Court of Canada
Telus again appealed and the 
Supreme Court of Canada was split 
in its ruling. Three members of the 
Court ruled that the text messages 
were private communications and the prospective 
production of future text messages required an 
authorization to intercept under Part VI of the 
Criminal Code. Under s. 487.01(1)(c)  the Crown is 
only  entitled to use a general warrant where it can 
be shown that no other provision would provide for 
a warrant, authorization or order permitting  the 
technique. If there is another provision available, a 
general warrant can not be used. “Viewed 
contextually, therefore, s. 487.01(1)(c)  stipulates that 
the general warrant power is residual and resort to it 
is precluded where judicial approval for the 
proposed technique, procedure or device or the 
‘doing  of the thing’ is available under the Code or 
another federal statute,” said Justice Abella. “In other 
words, s. 487.01(1)(c)  should be broadly construed 
to ensure that the general warrant is not used 
presumptively. This is to prevent the circumvention 
of more specific or rigorous pre-authorization 
requirements for warrants.”  Thus, if there was an 
“intercept,” a general warrant could not be used as it 
would fail the “no other provision” requirement.
Here, “the investigative technique authorized by the 
general warrant ... allowed the police to obtain 
prospective production of future text messages on a 
daily basis for a two-week period directly  from a 
service provider.”  The majority found Part VI applied 
to the prospective and continuous production of text 
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messages and the fact that the messages were stored 
in Telus’ computer did not mean their retrieval was 
not an “intercept”: 
The use of the word “intercept” implies that the 
private communication is acquired in the course 
of the communication process.   In my view, the 
process encompasses all activities of the service 
provider which are required for, or incidental to, 
the provision of the communications service.  
Acqui r ing the subs tance o f a pr iva te 
communication from a computer maintained by 
a telecommunications service provider would, 
as a result, be included in that process.   [para. 
37]
And further:
Part VI recognizes the dangers inherent in 
permitting access to the future private 
communications of a potentially unlimited 
number of people over a lengthy period of time.  
Those are the very risks inherent in the 
investigative technique in this case.  An 
authorization that permits police to obtain the 
prospective production of future text messages 
over a two-week period directly from the 
communications process used by the service 
provider is precisely what Part VI was intended 
to protect. In my view, the investigative 
technique in this case therefore qualifies as 
“intercepting private communications” under 
Part VI. 
An interpretation of “intercept a private 
communication” that includes the investigative 
technique used by police in this case finds 
support in the statutory definition of “intercept” 
in s. 183.  The definition includes the simple 
acquisition of a communication.   It does not 
require the acquisition of the communication 
itself; rather, the acquisition of the “substance, 
meaning or purport” of the communication is 
sufficient. Moreover, this interpretation is 
harmonious with the scheme and objectives of 
Part VI, which is drafted broadly in order to 
regulate and control a wide variety of 
technological invasions of privacy.   Finally, it 
strikes the appropriate balance between the 
serious invasion of privacy that results from the 
s u r r e p t i t i o u s a c q u i s i t i o n o f p r i v a t e 
communications and the evolving  needs of 
effective law enforcement. 
The police gained a substantial advantage by 
proceeding with a general warrant.  They did not 
need the Attorney General’s request for an 
authorization; they did not need to show that 
other investigative procedures had been tried 
and failed; they did not need to provide any 
notice to the target individuals; and they did not 
need to identify which other individuals’ private 
communications may be acquired in the course 
of the search. 
The general warrant in this case purported to 
au tho r i ze an i nve s t i ga t ive t echn ique 
contemplated by a wiretap authorization under 
Part VI, namely, it allowed the police to obtain 
prospective production of future private 
communications from a computer maintained by 
a service provider as part of its communications 
process.  Because Part VI applied, a general 
warrant under s. 487.01 was unavailable.  
[paras. 42-45]
Another View By Two - Substantive Equivalent
Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis 
also found the warrant invalid, but 
for different reasons. In their view, if 
the technique used was not an 
BY THE BOOK:
???????????	 ???	 ???????	 ???????? Criminal Code
s.  487.01 (1) A provincial court judge, a judge of 
a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a 
judge as defined in section 552 may issue a 
warrant in writing  authorizing  a peace officer 
to,  subject to this section, use any device or 
investigative technique or procedure or do any thing 
described  in the warrant that would, if not authorized, 
constitute an unreasonable search or seizure in respect of a 
person or a person’s property if
(c)  there is no other provision in this or any other Act of 
Parliament that would provide for a warrant, authorization 
or order permitting  the technique, procedure or device to 
be used or the thing to be done.
...
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intercept, it was substantively the equivalent of one. 
“What the police did in this case - securing 
prospective authorization for the delivery of future 
private communications on a continual, if not 
continuous, basis over a sustained period of time - 
was substantively equivalent to what they would 
have done pursuant to a Part VI authorization,” said 
Justice Moldaver. “It was thus, at a minimum, 
tantamount to an intercept.”  The police should have 
obtained a wiretap authorization; thus, a  general 
warrant was unavailable.
Dissenting Duo
Justice Cromwell, along  with Chief 
Justice McLachlin, concluded that 
t h e i nve s t i g a t i ve t e ch n i q u e 
authorized by the general warrant 
was not an intercept such that it required a wiretap 
authorization. Nor was the substantive equivalency 
test part of the “no other provision” analysis. 
Moreover, even if it was part of the test, the 
technique  used was not the substantive equivalent of 
a wiretap authorization. The justices concluded 
there  was no bar to the issuance of the  general 
warrant because the “no other provision” 
requirement had been met.
Telus’ appeal was allowed and the general warrant 
and related assistance order were quashed.
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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R. v. Vuozzo, 2013 ABCA 130
 
As part of a homicide investigation, 
police engaged in a 24 scenario “Mr. 
Big” operation in an effort to obtain 
inculpatory statements from the 
accused regarding  the murder. In one 
of the scenarios the police arranged a traffic stop. 
This ruse involved uniformed police officers 
stopping  a vehicle driven by an undercover officer 
with the accused and his mentor, another 
undercover officer, as passengers. This stop  occurred 
shortly after the police and the  accused had dug  a 
“grave site,” also part of the undercover operation. 
The uniformed officers were to obtain the accused’s 
already known name during  the traffic stop  and 
convey the message to him that a Homicide Unit 
Detective wanted the accused to call him.  The 
undercover officer driving  the vehicle was weaving 
slightly before the pull over and was instructed to 
perform a  roadside screening  test. The other 
undercover officer (the accused’s mentor) remained 
in the vehicle and told the accused to hand over his 
cell phone, since he  was not supposed to have one. 
In addition, the mentor told the accused “to be 
truthful about his name because if he  lied, and if the 
police started ‘digging  on him … it could draw 
attention to us and ... [his mentor] couldn’t be 
fingerprinted’”. 
The undercover mentor was first asked for his 
identification and then the accused was asked for 
his name and date of birth. The accused and the 
undercover officers were directed to place their 
hands on the car. They were patted down and told to 
sit on the curb and cross their legs. After police data 
bases were checked, an officer handed the accused 
a business card with a  detective’s name and 
telephone number on it and told him he needed to 
contact the detective. When the accused asked “Am 
I going  to jail today?”, the officer said “No.” The 
officer then gave directions to the  nearest liquor 
store since the men said they were looking  to buy 
beer. The entire length of the stop  was about 12 
minutes. Two days later the accused met with the 
boss (Mr. Big). He provided an inculpatory 
statement, admitting  to striking  him with a  machete 
and disposing  of the body. The accused was 
subsequently arrested and again admitted to the 
killing. He was charged with murder. 
WHAT IS A ‘MR. BIG’ OPERATION?
“A Mr. Big operation involves police posing as 
gang members with a view to recruiting a 
suspect. The suspect is asked to perform certain 
tasks with a “criminal element” to prove his 
faithfulness and honesty to the gang. The 
objective is to have the suspect reveal 
information to establish his trustworthiness, his 
ability to commit potentially criminal acts or acts 
in furtherance of a crime, and/or his criminal 
past. This information is obtained with a view to 
either the rehabilitation of the suspect’s record 
or to establish his credibility as a criminal.” - 
Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Vuozzo, 2013 ABCA 130 at para. 17.
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Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The judge found that the stop and 
business card provided about contacting 
the detective were on the accused’s mind 
when he spoke to the “boss.” As for the 
stop, the judge did not find the accused was 
detained simply by being  in the vehicle when it was 
pulled over. However, the accused was detained 
when he was directed out of the vehicle, responded 
to questions about his name and date of birth, and 
was patted down, directed to put his hands on the 
hood and sit on the curb. In the judge’s view, the 
traffic stop  was a ruse thereby rendering  the  stop 
arbitrary. The judge, however, went on to admit the 
evidence of the conversation with the “boss,” 
holding  that there was no link between the ruse and 
the accused’s statements. These statements, along 
with other evidence, led to a conviction of second 
degree murder and break and enter with intent to 
commit an indictable offence.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued, in part, that 
he was arbitrarily detained under s. 
9 of the Charter when the police 
stopped him during  the scenario 
and that his right to silence under s. 7 was also 
breached. He submitted that he had been detained 
the moment the vehicle was pulled over and it was 
arbitrary  because it was not a  valid traffic stop. These 
breaches during  the traffic stop, in his view, 
influenced (tainted) his conversation with the “boss” 
and the statements that arose through this arbitrary 
detention should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
The Alberta  Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. It 
found the accused had not been detained, arbitrary 
or otherwise, during the traffic stop scenario.
 
Detention?
 
The Court of Appeal noted that not every interaction 
wherein a police officer engages an individual in 
conversation or results in a  delay or waiting  for 
police, absent significant physical or psychological 
restraint, is a detention within the meaning  of ss. 9 
and 10 of the Charter. In this case, there were 
essential legal ingredients involving  the accused’s 
interaction with police lacking  from the concept of 
detention:
 
Detention situations are those where the 
individual, who may be a suspect, knows or 
reasonably believes that she is under a demand 
or direction emanating from the person she 
knows to be a state agent. However, the demand 
or direction from the state agent that has the 
detention effect must have legal implications for 
the person. Were it otherwise, every witness to a 
car crash who is told to wait until the officer has 
a chance to interview her will be detained in 
law. [para. 58]
 
Here, the accused was told to sit and wait while a 
database search was done. There was no charge or 
accusation to inform the accused under s. 10(a).  
Nor was there any demand or direction with legal 
consequences made to the accused. Nor was there 
any “power imbalance” permeating  the events that 
required leveling. “Ironically, when the [accused] 
asked if he was being  arrested, [the officer] told him 
‘no’,” said the Court. “There was no significant 
physical or psychological restraint.” The trial judge 
erred in finding a detention. 
Arbitrary?
 
Even if there was a detention, it would not have 
been arbitrary:
 
“Detention situations are those where the individual, who may be a suspect, knows or 
reasonably believes that she is under a demand or direction emanating from the person she 
knows to be a state agent. However, the demand or direction from the state agent that has 
the detention effect must have legal implications for the person. Were it otherwise, every 
witness to a car crash who is told to wait until the officer has a chance to interview her will be 
detained in law.”
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Case authority involving  police officers who stop 
motorists arbitrarily (in the sense of having  no 
reason to do so) is not, in our view, relevant to 
this issue. The officers here had plenty of rational 
reason to want to stop the vehicle and perform 
this ‘scenario’ for the [accused’s] benefit. The 
[accused’s] real objection is not a lack of basis to 
stop the vehicle and provide him with 
information, it is that the play-acting was false, 
pre-textual, and intended to mislead.
 
In other words, the stop was not arbitrary in the 
sense of lacking a basis. It was planned and 
intentional. Moreover, on this record, it had 
ample rational justification as part of the 
ongoing investigation. Seen through a clarifying 
legal lens, what the [accused] says converted the 
interaction into an arbitrary detention is the 
[accused] having been misled by police. This is 
not a logical basis to convert a rational form of 
detention into an arbitrary detention, unless on 
the facts it can be said that what the police did 
“bears no relation or is inconsistent with” the 
law which founds the state action. … In any 
event, arbitrariness raises an objective question. 
[references omitted, paras. 43-44]
 
Further, just because the police action was deceptive 
did not automatically make the stop  arbitrary. “The 
common law does not forbid the police from 
seeking  to loosen the tongue of suspects, even 
detainees,” said the Court. Nor was this case 
analogous to a conversation orchestrated by 
undercover police in a totally controlled cell plant 
scenario. And, even if it was similar, the police were 
not actively eliciting  inculpatory  information nor did 
they obtain any information they did not already 
have. Instead, they acted to mislead the accused and 
there  was “no law against lying  to criminals.” This 
case  was a legitimate stratagem and necessary 
incident of the undercover operation. The Court 
added:
 
At its highest, the [accused] may have thought 
the ‘boss’ could help him get out of the jeopardy 
of a police investigation. That was no basis for 
exclusion at common law. In light of the 
foregoing, there is no departure from the 
common law authority of police to investigate 
crime (which has long permitted subterfuges). 
Accordingly, police actions were not rendered 
so lawless as to be arbitrary in the sense of 
bearing no relationship to the legal authority on 
which it was based.
 
... The trickery used by the police was authorized 
by the common law. Being within the limits of 
the common law ..., the law which allows 
criminals to be misled is itself not arbitrary. The 
trial judge therefore erred in law in her 
conclusion that there was an arbitrary character 
to what the police did, even assuming it was a 
detention … . [paras. 51-52]
 
Right to Silence
 
Here, the police inquiry about the accused’s name 
and date of birth was not intended to acquire any 
self-incriminatory evidence. Furthermore, the  
prompting  by the undercover mentor to tell the truth 
and give his correct name  did not emanate from 
anyone known by the accused to be a police officer. 
Although the accused might have been entitled to 
decline to answer, the officer was nevertheless in the 
execution of his duty and there was nothing  wrong 
with the officer asking  the accused for his name. 
There was no s. 7 Charter breach.
 
s. 24(2) of the Charter
 
Even if the accused’s Charter rights were breached, 
the judge did not err in declining  to find the 
evidence was “obtained in a manner” that infringed 
Charter rights. And, if the evidence was linked to a 
Charter breach, it was nonetheless admissible under 
s. 24(2). Its admission would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“[T]here is no law against lying to criminals.”
“The trickery used by the police was authorized by the common law. Being within the limits of the 
common law ..., the law which allows criminals to be misled is itself not arbitrary.”
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Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
